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I. INTRODUCTION

The power to tax is a fundamental attribute of Indian tribes' sovereign
power. Like all governments, tribal governments need to raise revenue to
support their operations and may choose to use fiscal policy to influence
economic development. As tribal powers have been reduced by treaties,
statutes, and Supreme Court decisions, some degree of tribal taxation
authority has been retained throughout the years, and tribes have used their
taxation powers successfully to raise revenue and shape incentives for
regulatory purposes.
Taxation is more important than ever at this moment in history, as
tribal governments look for new ways to channel on-reservation economic
development for the benefit of tribal members. Despite frequent news
reports about lucrative casinos operated by some tribes,' approximately
half of all American Indians2 who live on reservation and trust land live
below the poverty level.3 Self-determination is a key factor in reservation
economic development, and federal Indian policy has shifted to grant
tribes greater control over the way they organize their affairs and deliver
services to their members." Tribal governments can use their taxation
powers to fulfill their sovereign roles and address the poverty that
continues to plague Indian Country.'
I. See, e.g., Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Who Gets the Money?, TIME MAG., Dec.
16, 2002, at 48.
2. The problematic origins of the term "Indian" demand an explanation as to why I use it
here. As David Wilkins has noted, while "Indian" and "American Indian" are geographically
inaccurate and ignore the great cultural diversity among the indigenous peoples of the United
States, they also are "the most common appellation used by many indigenous and nonindigenous
persons and by institutions." DAVID WILKINs, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE, at x (1997). "Native American" is abroader term that
is used to indicate Indians, Alaska Natives, and Native Hawaiians. See K. Kirke Kickingbird,
Vehicle of Change, 86 A.B.A. J., at 70 (2000). Accordingly, I follow Wilkins in using the term
"Indian" or "American Indian" to refer to individual indigenous persons. WLKINS, supra, at x-xi.
3. In 1989, 51% of American Indians living on reservations and trust lands were living
below the poverty level. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, WE THE
FIRST AMERICANS 10 (1993), available at http://www.census.gov/apsd/wepeople/we-5.pdf (last
visited Mar. 22, 2004).
4. WILKINS, supra note 2, at 187.
5. "Indian Country" is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151 as consisting of:
(a)all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under thejurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b)all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original
or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the
limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not
been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
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Unfortunately, the potential for tribes to use taxes for revenue and
regulation is limited, and the trend in Supreme Court decisions has been
to tighten tribal discretion to tax. Tribes continue to have broad powers to
tax the activities of members that take place on reservation land.6 Their
authority to tax nonmembers on reservation land has been significantly
limited, however, and the territorial extent of tribal tax powers does not
extend to fee simple land within reservation boundaries.7 Tribes must also
contend with competing state taxes, because the Court has been generous
with states that wish to impose their own taxes on on-reservation activity.'
Unlike states, tribes may not engage in competitive taxing to draw
nonmembers to reservation retailers.9 Tribes are further limited in their
ability to tax nonmember businesses and consumers because tribal taxes
must be collected in addition to state taxes, thereby putting tribal retailers
at a competitive disadvantage compared with nonmember, off-reservation
businesses."
Current tribal taxation doctrine fails to respect tribal sovereignty and
severely curtails tribes' powers to raise revenue and regulate onreservation conduct. Tribes lack the ability to exercise tax authority in a
manner that maximizes tribal welfare. There are explicit limitations
imposed by Court decisions, such as Montanav. UnitedStates," that limit
taxation over land and people within reservation boundaries. There are
implicit limitations imposed by a series of decisions granting states broad
taxation powers within reservations.' 2 Additional constraints are imposed
by the generally confused analysis in decisions such as Atkinson Trading
Co. v. Shirley, 3 which leave tribal governments with great uncertainty as
to what is permitted and what is forbidden.
Moreover, common law doctrines have become increasingly restrictive
at a time when congressional policy has shifted towards granting more
expansive powers to tribal governments. 4 The Supreme Court continues
to base its decisions on the analysis of statutes that were passed over a
century ago in furtherance of policies that have since been unequivocally
repudiated, an approach that may reflect concern about how the expanded
18 U.S.C. § 1151; see also Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450,453 n.2 (1995).
6. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 652-53 (2001).
7. See id. at 651, 653.
8. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 189 (1989).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 163-201.
13. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
14. David Wilkins, The Manipulation of Indigenous Status: The Federal Government as
Shape Shifter, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 223, 238-40 (2001).
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role of tribal governments will affect the power balance between the
federal and state governments. 5
Part IIof this Article begins by explaining how courts define the extent
of tribal tax power, an exercise that calls for an examination of how federal
policies that were abandoned long ago still continue to shape tribal
authority. This discussion is followed by a consideration of the balance of
power between federal, state, and tribal governments, and by an
examination of how this balance is managed in the taxation area by the
doctrines of preemption, sovereign immunity, and exhaustion of tribal
remedies.
After describing the variety of tribal revenue measures, this Article
considers three significant cases that help to define the extent of tribal
taxation powers. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 6 the Court
suggested that tribes have retained broad powers to tax nonmembers
conducting business within reservation boundaries. Merrion must be
interpreted in light of Washington v. ConfederatedTribes of the Colville
IndianReservation,7 however, which requires tribal taxes to compete with
overlapping state taxes. The Court's recent decision in Atkinson Trading
Co. made it clear that the broad tax authority recognized in Merrion is
limited to reservation land, and tribal tax power over activity on fee simple
land is very constrained.'S
Part III considers how state tax jurisdiction imposes further limitations
on tribal tax authority. Section III.A focuses on the implications of the
Court's decision in County of Yakima v. ConfederatedTribes and Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation. 9 While state taxation powers are limited
over tribal members who live or engage in activity within Indian Country,
jurisdiction substantially expands when nonmembers enter Indian Country
and when members leave the reservation. This results in substantial areas
of concurrent tax jurisdiction, so that even where tribes retain taxation
powers, their programs may need to be administered on a background of
state taxation over which the tribes have no control. Overlapping state
taxes reduce the revenue potential of tribal taxes, frustrate tribal regulatory
intentions, and generally impede the tribes' exercise of their inherent
sovereign power to tax.
15. Id. at 275; Scott A. Taylor, State PropertyTaxation of TribalFee Lands Located Within
Reservation Boundaries:ReconsideringCounty of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation and Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass County, 23 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 55, 83 (1998).
16. 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982).
17. 447 U.S. 134, 158-59 (1980).
18. Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 653.
19. 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
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The validity of both state and tribal taxes depends on their legal
incidence. Section III.B explains the nature of this test and argues that it
has been applied in an unpredictable manner despite its textual basis. Prior
to adopting the legal incidence test, the Court gave broader consideration
to the economic effects of taxes. This Article contends that an economic
burden test is preferable to the legal incidence test because it better enables
the Court to guard against state intrusions on tribal sovereignty.
Due to judicially-imposed limitations, tribes that wish to exercise their
sovereign power to tax must carefully craft provisions that cannot be
struck down. Part IV will suggest some possibilities, explaining how tribes
might act to preempt competing state taxes and how they can draft statutes
that fall under the Montana exceptions.
The provisions proposed in Part IV are complicated because the law so
strongly disfavors tribal tax authority. Accordingly, non-judicial solutions
may be more successful in restoring tribal taxation powers. This Article
concludes with a brief consideration of legislation and government-togovernment agreements on taxation. Such efforts can help tribes exercise
sovereignty through taxation despite the restrictive legal climate.
II. UNDERSTANDING TRIBAL POWERS To TAX

A. A BriefHistory of FederalIndian Policy
The shape of federal Indian policy has changed frequently and
dramatically over the country's history, and so has the judicial
understanding of tribal sovereignty. Yet each has moved along its own
path, and as statutory law has granted additional powers to tribes, courtmade law has imposed new limitations. Prior to 1871, when Congress
passed a statute forbidding treaty-making with tribes,2 ° common law
doctrines reflected a view that tribes were sovereign nations with
sovereign powers.2 The doctrine that tribes were "domestic, dependent
20. Indian Appropriation Act of Mar. 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871). Prior to this
enactment, relations with Indian tribes were governed primarily by Senate treaties. The House of
Representatives had been trying unsuccessfully for a number of years to create a larger role for
itself in shaping Indian policy, refusing at one point to appropriate funding for new treaties. This
led to the passage of the 1871 Act. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1975).
21. Professor Wilkins argues that Marshall superimposed notions of federal supremacy over
Indian tribal sovereignty, creating an often confusing body of doctrine based alternately on Indians'
political, racial, and individual statuses. See Wilkins, supra note 14, at 224.
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nations," however, limited tribal sovereignty in these early years, 22 and
more recently has been used by the Court to justify sharp constraints on
tribal powers.23
The allotment period, which began in the 1860s, is especially relevant
to the current law regarding tribal tax authority.24 Federal officials believed
that the elimination of communal land ownership was necessary to
"civilize" the tribes, and they pursued policies to speed this process.25 As
Justice Scalia has explained, "[t]he objectives of allotment were simple
and clear cut: to extinguish tribal sovereignty, erase reservation
boundaries, and force the assimilation of Indians into the society at
large. 26
Congress passed the General Allotment Act," which provided that trust
29
28
lands be divided and granted, or patented,

to individual Indians.

Pursuant to this statute, the government issued patents to allottees, but
continued to hold the individual allotments in trust for an additional
twenty-five years before granting a fee simple title,3" at which point
allottees and allotted land became subject to both civil and criminal state
laws.31 The Burke Act of 190632 amended the General Allotment Act to
22. See Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine:
Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future ofIndian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191,
192 (2001).
23. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) ("exercise of tribal power
beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is
inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation").
24. See WN
LIS, supra note 2, at 64-65.
25. Taylor, supra note 15, at 65.
26. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 254 (1992).
27. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 331-354 (2004)).
28. Black's Law Dictionary, 7th edition, defines a land patent as "[a]n instrument by which
the government conveys a grant of public land to a private person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1147 (7th ed. 1999).
29. General Allotment Act of 1887 § 1, 24 Stat. 388.
30. Id. § 5, 24 Stat. 389-90.
31. The Act stated:
[U]pon the completion of said allotments and the patenting of the lands to said
allottees, each and every member of the respective bands or tribes of Indians to
whom allotments have been made shall have the benefit of and be subject to the
laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may
reside ....
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give the Secretary of the Interior discretionary authority to grant full title
to allottees "whenever [the Secretary] shall be satisfied that any Indian
allottee is competent and capable of managing his or her affairs.. .," even
if the full trust period had not passed.33 The Burke Act specified that once
the Secretary granted a fee simple title, the land no longer would be under
exclusive federal jurisdiction, but would become subject to taxation by the
state.34 The Supreme Court has held that fee simple land has the same legal
status whether the fee simple title was granted under the original General
Allotment Act or the Burke Act.35 Land was allotted pursuant to other
federal statutes as well, although the General Allotment Act and the Burke
Act have figured most prominently in the case law addressing jurisdiction
over allotted land.36
The allotment system proved ineffective as a method of assimilation,
and it also resulted in the widespread loss of Indian lands. Two-thirds of
tribal lands were transferred to non-Indians once alienation restrictions
were lifted." Those allottees who avoided selling their land to speculators
were often foreclosed upon because of nonpayment of state taxes.38
Allotment has continued to create problems for the tribes long after the
policies themselves ended. In addition to the policies' direct, long-term
impact on members and tribes that lost land, the land status
"checkerboard" created within Indian Country has created ajurisdictional
conundrum for courts and legislatures and weakened tribal power by
making the scope of self-governance uncertain.
Federal policies took a sharp turn in 1934 with the passage of the
Indian Reorganization Act, which was enacted to roll back the policies of
Id. § 6. This language is ambiguous as to whether state jurisdiction extends when the allotments
are made or at the end of the twenty-five year restricted period. Congress passed the Burke Act to
clarify this point. See Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. at 255.
32. Burke Act of 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182.
33. Id.
34. The statute says that after fee simple title is issued,
all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be removed
and said land shall not be liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to
the issuing of such patent: Providedfurther,That until the issuance of fee-simple
patents all allottees to whom trust patents shall hereafter be issued shall be subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
Id.
35. See Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. at 264.

36. See id. at 270. For a discussion of other allotment statutes, see WILINs, supra note 2,
at 64; U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 63-64 (1942).
37. Taylor, supra note 15, at 68.
38. Id.
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the allotment period.3 9 The Act declared an end to allotments of tribal land,
while extending indefinitely not only the trust status of remaining nonallotted trust lands, but also the restrictions placed on land that had been
allotted, but not yet granted in fee simple.4 ° This left an additional
complication in the pattern of land status within reservation boundaries,
because, in addition to fee-simple and reservation land, a third category land that had been allotted, but for which fee simple title was never
granted - also continued to exist. This land should be treated like trust
land, since it never attained fee status, but unlike other trust land, judicial
analysis of its status might be affected by the legislative purpose behind
the Indian Reorganization Act.4'
In addition to halting allotment policies, the Indian Reorganization Act
authorized the Secretary to take new lands into trust and to create new
reservations, 42 noting that such lands "shall be exempt from State and local
' It also included provisions under which tribes could create
taxation."43
constitutions and bylaws44and receive a charter of incorporation from the
Secretary of the Interior.
The policies embodied in the Indian Reorganization Act that
encouraged tribal self-governance and economic development did not last
long, however, and in the 1950s federal policy once again shifted against
tribal power. The new policy favored termination of Indian tribes and
elimination of the trust relationship with the federal government in order
39. Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461-479 (2004)); see WILKINs, supra note 2, at 118.
40. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, §§ 1-2.
41. See County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
502 U.S. 251, 255 (1992).
42. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, §§ 4, 7.
43. Id.§ 5.
44. Id. §§ 16-17. This statute is the focus ofMescaleroApache Tribe v. Jones.The Mescalero
Apache Tribe built a ski resort on land adjacent to the reservation with funding provided under
section 10 of the Act. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 146 (1973). The Court
rejected the argument that the project was a federal government instrumentality immune from state
taxation under the Indian Reorganization Act. Id. at 150-55. The Court also interpreted the section
5 state tax exemption to apply to "land and rights in land, not income derived from its use." Id. at
155. Thus the Court found that nondiscriminatory taxes on income earned by the ski resort were
permitted, but that a compensating use tax imposed on permanent improvements to the property
could not be imposed. Id. at 157-58.
Robert A. Williams suggests that the concepts of self-government that formed the basis for
the Indian Reorganization Act conflicted with traditional values. "The infusion of non-Indian
political and social values and institutions into tribal life created tensions and destructive factions,
which continue to impede Indian progress today." Robert A. Williams, Jr., SmallSteps on the Long
Road to Self-Sufficiency for IndianNations: The Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of
1982,22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335, 353 (1985).
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to facilitate assimilation.45 The termination policies were abandoned by the
1960S,46 but not before generating additional legal complications for
affected tribes.47
The end of the termination policies began a period in which federal
policy focused on self-determination and economic development within
a framework of government-to-government relations.4" The Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 strengthened the role
of tribal governments in the administration of federal programs.49 Other
enactments attempted to put tribal governments on par with state and local
governments in the receipt of certain federal benefits.5 °
Tribal government power and influence has increased dramatically
since the 1980s with the expansion of Indian gaming. The Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA), passed in 1988, created a framework for federal,
state, and tribal governments to coordinate oversight of gaming
operations.5 ' In 2001, gross tribal government revenues from Indian
gaming totaled $12.7 billion.52 Not all tribes have developed gaming
business, and some tribes that have are reaping only modest profits.5 3
Nonetheless, the astronomical revenues generated by some casinos support
a powerful lobby for tribal interests at both the state and national levels.54
As a result, while poverty remains pervasive, some tribes are poised to
assert their unique legal status with greater strength than would have been
conceivable just twenty years ago.
At the same time that Congress was backing off its historically
oppressive legislative policies, the courts were restricting tribal powers,

45. WLKINs, supra note 2, at 166.
46. Williams, supra note 44, at 354.
47. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (dispute over
whether tribal sovereignty over hunting and fishing rights had been terminated).
48. WILKINS, supra note 2, at 187 (explaining how the passage of the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act in 1975 led to a period of greater tribal involvement
in tribal administration).
49. Id.
50. See Wilkins, supra note 14, at 230-32.
51. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of Oct. 17, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 24672486 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2004)).
52. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs,
108th Cong. 41 (2003) (prepared statement of Ernest L. Stevens, Jr., Chairman, Nat'l Indian
Gaming Comm'n).
53. See generally Bartlett & Steele, supra.note 1, at 48 (Oglala Sioux annual profit totaled
$2.4 million to be spread over 41,000 tribe members).
54. See generally Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Playing the PoliticalSlots, TIME
MAG., Dec. 23, 2002, at 52 (aggressive lobbying by Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians won the
insertion of a provision worth $180,000 a year into federal appropriations bill).
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both explicitly and by casting doubt on the extent of tribal sovereignty.55
One of the most significant cases decided during this period was Montana
v. UnitedStates, which struck down hunting and fishing regulations that
had been imposed by the Crow Tribe on non-Indians who had entered onto
lands within the outer boundaries of the reservation that were held in feesimple by non-Indians. 6 The Court stated a "general proposition that the
inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities
of nonmembers of the tribe" in the absence of congressional authorization,
and went on to find two exceptions to the rule." First, tribal regulation,
including taxation, was allowed when the nonmembers whose activity was
regulated had entered consensual relationships with either the tribe or its
members.5 8 Second, tribal regulation was allowed when the regulated
conduct "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."59 The Montana
Court failed to provide much guidance as to the content of either of the
exceptions, but later opinions have interpreted both narrowly. °
In particular, two cases decided in 2001 substantially limited the
Montana exceptions. In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,6 the Navajo
Nation imposed a hotel occupancy tax of eight percent on all hotel rooms
within the reservation, including those located on land held in fee simple
that were owned or operated by nonmembers and occupied by nonmember
guests.62 The case involved a hotel that was owned by a nonmember
company and was located on fee-simple land within the reservation.63 The
Court assumed that the guests at the hotel were nonmembers.' Noting that

55. See WnLKINS, supra note 2, at 236-37.
56. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 567 (1981).
57. Id.at 565.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 565-66.
60. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (Navajo Nation may not
impose hotel occupancy tax on rooms at a hotel located on land held in fee simple within the
reservation); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (Indians' right to make and be governed by
their own laws does not include the right to assert jurisdication over tort claims against state
officers who enter the reservation to execute state process in connection with a violation of state
laws that occurred offthe reservation); Stratev. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (subcontract
between defendant and the reservation was inadequate to meet the first exception, and careless
driving was inadequate to meet the second exception); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (limiting tribe's power to zone fee simple lands
within the reservation).
61. Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 645.
62. Id. at 648.
63. Id.
at 647-48.
64. See id. at 654.
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Congress had not authorized the tax,6" the Court analyzed the provision
and found that it failed to meet the requirements of either Montana
exception. While the hotel benefited from services provided by the Navajo
Nation, the resulting relationship did not rise to the level required under
Montana.66 Furthermore, "[a] nonmember's consensual relationship in one
area... does not trigger tribal civil authority in another - it is not 'in for
a penny, in for a Pound."' 67 Therefore, even if an adequate consensual
relationship existed between the hotel and the tribe, it would not justify
jurisdiction to tax the hotel's guests.6"
The Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in a non-tax case, Nevada v.
Hicks,69 suggested that the Montana exceptions might be applied more
narrowly in the future, focusing on whether, in the absence of
congressional authorization, tribal jurisdiction was "necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations."7 The Court in
Hicks found that tribal courts could not exercise jurisdiction over a section
1983 claim71 "against state officials who entered tribal land to execute a
search warrant against a tribe member suspected of having violated state
law outside the reservation."72 The opinion leaned towards eliminating
land status as a factor in determining tribal jurisdiction, noting that
although, "[h]itherto, the absence of tribal ownership has been virtually
conclusive of the absence of tribal civil jurisdiction... [,] the existence of
tribal ownership is not alone enough to support regulatory jurisdiction over
nonmembers."73 Later in the opinion, however, in response to Justice
O'Connor's dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that "tribal ownership is a factor
in the Montana analysis, and a factor significant enough that it 'may
sometimes be ...dispositive[.]"'' The latter statement may be a more
accurate appraisal of the current state of the law.75 Subsequent lower court
65. Id.
66. Atkinson TradingCo., 532 U.S. at 655.
67. Id.at 656 (citation omitted).
68. Id. at 657.
69. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
70. Id. at 360 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)). The Court
dismissed the consent prong of Montanaby determining that it applied only to private consensual

relationships and not to official acts. Id. at 359 n.3.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (permitting a plaintiff to bring a civil claim for the violation of rights
that arise under either the U.S. Constitution or federal statute when the violation has been
committed under color of state law).
72. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 355.
73. Id. at 360.
74. Id. at 370 (citation omitted).
75. Even if Justice Rehnquist's view were that land status has no relevance to determining
tribal jurisdiction, five justices appear to believe that it is significant. Justice Ginsburg's concurring
opinion in Hicks suggests that land status was a significant factor in the finding in Strate v. A-I
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decisions have generally limited the holding in Hicks to the facts of the
case, suggesting that the opinion will have little impact on the extent of
tribal tax jurisdiction.76
The majority opinions inAtkinson Trading Co. and Hicks demonstrate
how historical, restrictive legislative policies that have since been
repudiated continue to impact tribal sovereignty. Thirty years have passed
since Congress replaced policies that had been intended to eliminate tribes
as political entities with policies that encourage self-governance. The
legislative intent of the Congress that passed the General Allotment Act
was to eliminate the tribes on all levels, including as political entities.77
The policies behind the legislation have been completely repudiated since
its passage, and the most recent trend in congressional policy has been to
build up the powers of tribal governments.78 The Supreme Court has
nonetheless maintained the repudiated system ofland status that developed
during the anti-sovereignty period in order to limit tribal powers, including
the power to tax. In effect, these new restrictive common law doctrines
reign in tribal authority at a historical moment when tribes are otherwise
poised to assume more prominent political and economic roles.
B. Balance of Powers
Throughout the history of tribal jurisdiction, the balance between
federal, state, and tribal powers has been a persistent theme.79 The
relationship between tribes and the federal government is distinct from the
relationship between the states and the federal government. Tribal
sovereignty differs from state sovereignty, and tribal rights and obligations
Contractors,520 U.S. 438,456 (1997), that the tribe lacked jurisdiction over the nonmember driver
who was involved in an accident on the equivalent of "alienated, non-Indian land[,]" although she
also said that both Strate and Hicks left open the question of whether the tribe has jurisdiction over
nonmember conduct on tribal land. Id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor's
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment on Hicks, which was joined by Justices

Stevens and Breyer, clearly states that land status is "an important factor in determining the scope
of a tribe's civil jurisdiction." Id. at 389 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Finally, although Justice
Rehnquistjoined Justice Scalia's opinion inHicks, the analysis in hisAtkinson TradingCo. opinion
relied heavily on land status. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 354; Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S.
645, 653 (2001).

76. See, e.g., McDonald v. Means, 300 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2002); Wisconsin v. E.P.A., 266
F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001); Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 212 F. Supp. 2d 163 (W.D.N.C.
2002).
77. Taylor, supra note 15, at 83.
78. See id.; Williams, supra note 44.
79. For an examination of federal, state, and tribal taxation interests, see Jennifer Nutt
Carleton, State Income Taxation ofNonmember Indians in IndianCountry, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
253, 273-79 (2003).
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vis ii vis the federal government are different from those of the states."0 Yet
federal, state, and tribal powers are closely intertwined with shifting
alliances of interests that sometimes put the tribes in opposition to the
federal government, but sometimes pit the federal government against the
states to uphold tribal rights."'
The balance of powers is related to the interplay of federal, state, and
tribal interests. At times, tribal and federal interests are aligned. 2
Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs and the federal government's
trust relationship to Indian tribes often lead to Justice Department
participation on behalf of the tribes in disputes against the states.8 3 Tribes
organized under the Indian Reorganization Act may adopt constitutions
and bylaws with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior." As a result,
when states challenge these enactments, the states challenge the
Secretary's actions.
The connection between federal and tribal interests is incorporated into
the federal Indian law doctrine of preemption, which differs from ordinary
preemption. Indian law preemption, which will be considered in more
detail infra, calls for a fact-specific balancing of state, federal, and tribal
interests.85 Theoretically, a court might find preemption solely on the basis
of weighty tribal interests, but preemption decisions have more often been
based on strong federal interests that make state action inappropriate.86 As

80. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 653 n.5 (dismissing analogies between state
and tribal taxing authority).
81. See Wilkins, supra note 14, at 224.
82. See Carleton, supra note 79, at 275-76.
83. This coincidence of interests is illustrated in amicus briefs filed by the U.S. government
on behalf of the tribes. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 656.
84. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 326 (1983).
85. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989).
86. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (state taxes on
non-tribal corporations conducting business solely on tribal land are preempted by federal
legislation in the area of timber management and by BIA management efforts); Moe v.
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 480-81 (1976), stating that
[P]ersonal property tax on personal property located within the reservation; the
vendor license fee sought to be applied to a reservation Indian conducting a
cigarette business for the Tribe on reservation land; and the cigarette sales tax, as
applied to on-reservation sales by Indians to Indians, conflict with the
congressional statutes which provide the basis for decision with respect to such
impositions.
Id. (citations omitted); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965)
(Federal Indian trader statutes preempt state income tax imposed on licensed trader).
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a result, in many situations, the strongest argument for tribal jurisdiction
may be the existence of federal interests as demonstrated by heavy
involvement of the federal government in a particular area of tribal life.87
Under different circumstances, federal involvement in Indian affairs
may have the effect of reducing tribal sovereignty, since Congress's
plenary power to regulate Indian affairs includes the power to abrogate
tribal powers.88 When courts find that Congress has abrogated certain
rights, or that tribes lack txclusive regulatory powers, the corollary is that
those rights or powers lie elsewhere. In the field of taxation, those rights
or powers generally lie with the states.
For example, in Atkinson Trading Co., the Court noted that tribal
sovereignty had been limited by treaties and statutes subsequent to the
tribes' original incorporation into the United States, reducing tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers and nontribal land.89 The Court had held in
prior decisions that states retain broad taxing authority over their residents,
even when tribal activity is involved.90 In the context of the hotel room
taxes at issue in Atkinson Trading Co., this means that states retain broad
tax authority over nonmember hotel guests to the exclusion of tribal
authority. By finding tribal powers abrogated over nonmember activity on
fee land, the Court effectively preserved those powers to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the states. Thus, although "tribal sovereignty is dependent
on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States[,]" 91
Congress nevertheless may effectively grant powers to the states when it
limits tribal rights.
When a tribal tax statute's validity is challenged, tribal sovereign
immunity limits judicial review unless there has been a clear tribal waiver
or congressional abrogation.92 For example, the Ninth Circuit held that
sovereign immunity protected a tribe from a suit challenging a possessory
interest tax, noting that an exception would be made if the tribe had made
an "express and unequivocal waiver," or if immunity had been limited by
Congress. 9 3 It appears, however, that the doctrine does not bar suits in all
87. See generally, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 324 (substantial partnership
between federal government and tribe to develop resort on the reservation, including development
of game resources, preempted state hunting and fishing regulations).
88. See Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 192.
89. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 650-51 (2001).
90. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 462-63 (1995).
91. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153
(1980).
92. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509
(1991).
93. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe ofBlackfeet Indian Reservation, 924 F.2d 899,
901 (9th Cir. 1991).
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contexts, as the Supreme Court has upheld tribal taxes in cases brought
directly against tribes without considering the issue of sovereign
immunity.9" The Court has also found tribal statutes invalid in suits
brought against tribal officers, suggesting that sovereign immunity does
not bar officer suits. 95
In theory, sovereign immunity protects tribes against enforcement
actions by states to collect state taxes, even when they are validly
imposed. For example, the state cannot collect lost revenues from tribal
retailers that conduct business with nonmembers and fail to collect the
required state sales taxes.97 The tribe cannot waive its immunity merely by
availing itself of the federal courts for adjudication of the validity of a state
tax. In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe,9 8 the Court held that the Tribe did not waive sovereign immunity by
filing for an injunction to stop a state tax assessment on a tribally-operated
convenience store located on trust land that sold cigarettes to nonmembers
without collecting the state cigarette tax, although the state was not barred
from imposing collection requirements on the retailers. 99 The Court said
that states could negotiate with tribes to create agreements regarding tax
collection, and the states could also lobby Congress to obtain legislation
abrogating tribal sovereign immunity under these circumstances.' 0 The
Court also indicated that the state might be able to file suit against tribal
officers or against the wholesalers supplying the retailers with cigarettes.' 0 '
Although the Court did not consider the sovereign immunity question
in Atkinson Trading Co., its invalidation of the Navajo Nation's hotel
occupancy tax in a suit against Navajo Nation officers suggests that the
protections afforded by PotawatomiIndian Tribe are not sufficient to bar
challenges to tribal tax statutes. The potential for officer suits creates an
exception that may swallow the rule of tribal sovereign immunity, even
though the likelihood of recovering the full value of uncollected taxes may
be less in a suit against individual officers. States also may be able to
pursue taxes owed by tribes if states can attach fee-simple land owned by
94. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
95. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); Blackfeet Tribe, 924
F.2d at 901-02 ("[Tiribal officials are not immune from suit to test the constitutionality ofthe taxes
they seek to collect.").
96. See generally Polawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. at 505 (holding that sovereign
immunity precluded Oklahoma from taxing sales of goods to tribe members).
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 511-14.
100. Id. at 514.
101. See PotawatomiIndian Tribe, 498 U.S. at 514.
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the tribe. However, there is some support for the argument that tribal
sovereign immunity should extend to land owned by the tribe.'0 2
In theory, plaintiffs wishing to challenge tribal tax provisions must first
exhaust tribal court remedies before they bring a claim to the federal
courts.' °3 The doctrine of exhaustion of tribal remedies requires that
questions about the extent of a tribe's civil jurisdiction be first considered
by tribal courts to encourage tribal self-government and to allow the
federal courts to benefit from the tribal courts' expertise. 1° , Litigants who
wish to challenge the tribal court's jurisdiction to determine the validity of
a tax provision may bring a separate claim in federal court after the tribal
court has had an opportunity to determine the issue.'0 5 However, an
exception to the exhaustion requirement will be made when tribal
jurisdiction is asserted to harass or is otherwise in bad faith, "where the
action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where
exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity
to challenge the court's jurisdiction."" Since the exhaustion doctrine was
announced in the 1985 NationalFarmersdecision, the Supreme Court has
not heard a tax case directly raising the doctrine's applicability.0 7 The
Eighth Circuit has rejected challenges to tribal tax provisions on the
grounds that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust tribal remedies,'0 8 although the
Ninth Circuit has been more reluctant to require exhaustion.'0 9
The exhaustion doctrine provides only limited protection to tribal tax
powers. The doctrine's exceptions are poorly defined and a court could
102. See infra text accompanying notes 200-0 1.
103. See Reservation Tel. Coop. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation,
76 F.3d 181, 186 (8th Cir. 1996); Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort
Berthold Reservation, 27 F.3d 1294, 1299-1300 (8th Cir. 1994).
104. See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57
(1985).
105. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 648-49 (2001).
106. NationalFarmers,471 U.S. at 856 n.21.
107. The exhaustion doctrine was not an issue in Atkinson Trading Co. because the challenge
to the tax was first brought before the Navajo Tax Commission and the Navajo Supreme Court. See
Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 648-49.
108. See Reservation Tel. Coop., 76 F.3d at 186; Duncan Energy Co., 27 F.3d at 1294; see
generally Texaco, Inc. v. Hale, 81 F.3d 934 (10th Cir. 1996) (no clear error by district court when
it dismissed a challenge to severance and business activity taxes for failure to exhaust tribal
remedies).
109. See, e.g., Burlington Northern R.R. v. Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet Indian Reservation,
924 F.2d 899,901 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (in upholding tribal imposition of possessory tax on railroad
easements, the circuit court found that exhaustion of tribal remedies was unnecessary because there
were no tribal law issues and no pending case before a tribal court, tribal courts would not have
special expertise on the issue, and district court decisions regarding the federal law issues would
not have been aided by exhaustion).
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avoid requiring exhaustion by finding that a tax provision was "patently
violative" of express jurisdictional provisions. Exhaustion does not prevent
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction to determine the validity of
tribal tax provisions after the tribal adjudication is complete. Federal
courts reviewing tribal court decisions defer to tribal courts and review
fact findings under a clearly erroneous standard, but the tribal court's
jurisdiction is a question of federal law and is afforded de novo review."'
If the federal court rules against jurisdiction following a plaintiff's
unsuccessful challenge to a tax provision in tribal court, then exhaustion
will merely postpone invalidation of the statute."'
C. Tribal Taxes
Taxation is one of the inherent sovereign powers of tribes, "a necessary
instrument of self-government and territorial management.""' Like other
sovereign powers, tribes need the ability to collect tax revenue in order to
fund governmental services." 3 In addition, tribes may implement tax
strategies to create incentives or disincentives for particular activities on
the reservation. 4
Discussions of tribal taxes by the courts treat the provisions almost
exclusively as revenue raising measures. Although most tribes suffer from
a weak tax base," 5 some have managed to raise substantial funds by
imposing taxes on wealthy businesses operating on the reservation, or on
high-volume commercial transactions connected with the reservation. The
success of revenue measures often relies on the power to tax nonmembers
and on whether competing state taxes limit the tax that tribes can impose
without driving business off of the reservation. For example, a tax imposed
by the Colville Indian Reservation on cigarette sales raised about $266,000
between 1972 and 1976, a period when cigarette vendors on the
reservation charged tribal taxes in lieu of state taxes before the Supreme
Court determined that states can require tribal retailers to collect state
taxes." 6 Tribes with significant natural resources on their reservations
110. Duncan Energy Co., 27 F.3d at 1300.
111. See Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 659.
112. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982).
113. Id.
114. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes ofthe Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
156 (1980).
115. See Williams, supra note 44, at 385 (criticizing the Tribal Tax Status Act of 1982 for
failing to address economic development on Indian reservations, thus giving the tribes "[o]nly the
theoretical ability to exercise broadly based taxing authority over a nonexistent tax base.").
116. Colville, 447 U.S. at 144. During that period, the tribe attracted nonmembers onto the

reservation to purchase cigarettes by charging its own tax in lieu of the higher state cigarette tax.
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have larger and more stable tax bases, and therefore have especially large
revenue-raising potential." 7 The severance tax imposed by the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe on nonmember mineral companies with on-reservation oil
and gas leases had the potential to raise over $2 million per year."'
Tribes also may impose taxes in order to exert regulatory power over
natural resource exploitation, pollution, alcohol sales, or other activities.' 19
The Supreme Court has suggested that under the right circumstances, such
taxes might preempt similar state taxes. 2 ° Preemptive taxes would likely
need to be part of a broad regulatory program, such as the program to
develop tribal resources described in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe.'2 ' Areas that are particularly promising for tribal taxation are
discussed at greater length in Part IV.
Tribal taxes take a wide variety of forms. Tribes tax nonmember, onreservation business
activity by imposing privilege taxes, 2 2 business
activity taxes, 123 excise taxes, 12 and ad valorem taxes on goods and
services. 125 Tribes may impose severance taxes and possessory interest
taxes on nontribal businesses that exploit mineral, gas, or other natural
Id. at 142. The tribe's revenue-collecting powers were reduced by the Supreme Court, which held
that the state could require that state taxes be collected on cigarette sales to nonmembers. Id. at 161.
117, See, e.g., Merrion, 455 U.S. at 130; Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S.
163, 163 (1989).

118. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 167 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119, See SHARoNO'BRmN, AMERICAN INDLANTRmALGOVERNMENTS 232-33 (1989).

120. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 156.
121,

In New Mexico v. MescaleroApache Tribe, the Court found that New Mexico could not

impose its hunting and fishing regulations on on-reservation hunting because the regulations were
preempted by the extensive program developed by the Tribe in conjunction with the federal
government to manage game on the reservation. 462 U.S. 324 (1983). Hunting and fishing licensing
could be viewed as similar to taxation to the extent that the licensing fee is effectively a tax on the
activity. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 685 (1942).
122. A privilege tax is "a tax on the privilege of carrying on a business or occupation for
which a license or franchise is required." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1471 (7th ed. 1999); see, e.g.,
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 167-68 (1989); Cherokee Tribal Code, ch.
105, §§ 30-33, availableat http://doc.narf.org/nill/Codesebcicodeeccodech 105tax.htm (last visited
July 23, 2004).
123. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195, 197 (1985)
(Navajo Tribe imposed business activity tax "on receipts from the sale of property produced or
extracted within the Navajo Nation, and from the sale of services within the nation").
124. Excise taxes are imposed "on the manufacture, sale, or use of goods ... or on an
occupation or activity." BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY 585 (7th ed. 1999); see, e.g., Colville, 447 U.S.
at 144 (licensed Indian traders sell cigarettes at wholesale price plus a forty to fifty cent tax).
125. An ad valorem tax is imposed "proportional on the value" of the thing taxed. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1469 (7th ed. 1999); see, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645,
648 (2001) (Navajo Nation imposed eight percent hotel occupancy tax on hotel rooms within the
reservation).
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resources on the reservation. Severance taxes take the form of a charge per
unit of the product removed from land within the reservation, and have
been upheld by the Supreme Court as a valid exercise of tribal
sovereignty.126 In lieu of property taxes, tribes may impose possessory
interest taxes on the value of property leased within the reservation.'" For
example, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have upheld taxes on easements
granted to railroads and utility companies. 2 '
In the past, tribes have claimed tax exemptions for tribal retailers, and
then marketed the exemptions to non-Indians in order to increase
commerce and raise tribal revenues.'29 In Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation,3 ' the Court held that such practices
were impermissible because they interfered with state taxation powers.
The Court rejected the argument that state taxes should be preempted by
the tribal taxes, stating that "[t]here is no direct conflict between the state
and tribal schemes, since each government is free to impose its taxes
without ousting the other."'' Because the tribal scheme relied on an
exemption from state taxes, however, the imposition of the state tax
effectively ousted the tribal taxes by making it impossible for the tribes to
impose their own taxes without making products sold on the reservation
non-price competitive. The Court left open the possibility that the tribes
could enact a regulatory program to curb smoking that would preempt
state taxes. 32 However, it is unclear what would qualify as such a
program, because the opinion also noted that existing ordinances
"comprehensively regulat[ing] the marketing of cigarettes by the tribal
enterprises" did not preempt state excise taxes on sales of cigarettes to
126. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla.Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 136 (1982) ("[t]he tax is
assessed at the wellhead at $0.05 per million Btu's of gas produced and $0.29 per barrel of crude
oil or condensate produced on the reservation, and it is due at the time of severance"); see also
Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1386 (1996) (upholding severance tax imposed on
allotted land held in trust).
127. See, e.g., Cotton PetroleumCorp., 490 U.S. at 168 n.2 (Jicarilla Apache Tribe imposed
tax on leasehold and other possessory interests); Kerr-McGee Corp., 471 U.S. at 197 (upholding
Navajo Tribe's tax of three percent on the value of leasehold interests on the reservation); Barta v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553, 556 (8th Cir. 1958) (upholding Oglala Sioux Tribe's imposition
of a "license tax" on nonmember lessors of tribal land).
128. See generally, e.g., Reservation Tel. Coop. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation, 76 F.3d 181 (8th Cir. 1996) (tribe imposes possessory interest tax on right-of-way
across reservation lands for telephone lines); Burlington Northern R.R. v. Blackfeet Tribe of
Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding possessory interest tax on
easements granted to railroad across reservation lands).
129. See, e.g., Colville, 447 U.S. at 145.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 158.
132. Id. at 158-59.
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nonmembers.' The Court's decision in Colville, and its decision in
Montana one year later, sharply curtailed tribal powers to raise money by
taxing transactions involving nonmembers on reservation land.
D. Taxing Nonmembers After Montana and Colville
After the Montana framework was announced, the Court's decision in
Merrion v. JicarriaApache Tribe'34 suggested that certain tribal taxation
powers remained intact, at least on reservation land. Merrion upheld a
severance tax that the tribe imposed on nonmembers who had entered into
mineral leases with the tribe on reservation land.' The Court affirmed
that "[t]he power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty
because it is a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial
management."' 36 However, the power was not described as unlimited.
Tribes may tax nonmembers "only to the extent the nonmember enjoys the
privilege of trade or other activity on the reservation to which the tribe can
attach a tax ....
the limited authority that a tribe may exercise over
nonmembers does not arise until the nonmember enters the tribal
jurisdiction.""' In Merrion,the Court stated that the potential for the tribe
to abuse its taxation powers was limited by the requirement that the
Secretary of the Interior approve any taxes before they were imposed. 3
In spite of this apparent skepticism about increasing tribal tax power,
Merrion is primarily significant because it makes clear that some degree
of taxation power over nonmembers on reservation land survived the
Montana decision. In light of the Court's later opinion inAtkinson Trading
Co., discussed below, Merrion appears to stand for the proposition that
tribes retain broad sovereign taxation powers on tribal land.'39 The factors
considered in Merrion,therefore, may have little relevance to determining
whether tribes have the power to tax nonmember activity on fee land rather
than reservation land.
133. Id.
134. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
135. Id. at 135. The opinion discussed at length the manner in which the tax provision had
been passed. The Tribe's Constitution, which was passed pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act
with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, permitted the Tribal Council to impose taxes on
nonmembers with the Secretary's approval. The provision challenged in the case had been passed
as required by the Constitution. See id. at 134-36.
136. Id. at 137; see also Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 555, 556 (8th Cir. 1958).
137. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 141-42.
138. General Allotment Act of 1887, § 5, 24 Stat. 389-90.
139. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645,653 (2001) ("Merrion,however, was
careful to note that an Indian tribe's inherent power to tax only extended to 'transactions occurring

on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its members."' (citations omitted)).
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It is noteworthy that tribal interests played a role in Merrion.The Court
rejected the proposition that tribal taxation powers derive from the tribe's
power to exclude, finding that the power derives instead "from the tribe's
general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its
jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing governmental services by
requiring contributions from persons or enterprises engaged in economic
activities within that jurisdiction."' 4 ° These interests are "strongest when
the revenues are derived from value generated on the reservation by
activities involving the Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of
tribal services.''. Significant tribal interests were implicated in Merrion
because the tribe provided police and other government services, as well
as "the advantages of a civilized society."' 42 These interests were not
weakened by the tribe's receipt of royalty payments from the taxed
entities, because a tribe's status as a sovereign entity is distinct from its
status as a business partner.'43
This focus on value-added in Merrionwas intended to distinguish the
case from the situation in Colville, which the Court viewed as involving
the marketing of a tax advantage only. The language in Colville exhibits
a certain level of disdain for the tribe's revenue-raising tactics: "[i]t is
painfully apparent that the value marketed by the smokeshops to persons
coming from outside is not generated on the reservations by activities in
which the Tribes have a significant interest."' 44 This attitude may reflect
in part the Court's attitude toward the cigarette business at issue in
Colville. It may also be symptomatic of a general distrust for taxation and
a belief that the right to impose taxes must be earned by the sovereign
power. The Court failed, however, to explain why tax-based competition
would be any less appropriate between a tribe and a state than it would be
between two states, appearing to hold tribal taxation to a different and
higher standard than state taxation.
In Merrion and Colville, the nonmembers' taxed activities occurred on
tribal land. In contrast, in Atkinson Trading Co., the Court focused on
taxation of nonmember activities on fee land.' As discussed briefly
140. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137.
141. Id. at 138 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 156-57 (1980)). The Court was attempting to distinguish Merrion from Colville, in
which a cigarette tax imposed by the tribes on cigarette sales was found not to implicate significant
tribal interests. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 154.
142. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137-38 (citations omitted). These factors would not be adequate to
give the tribe tax jurisdiction under Atkinson Trading Co. See Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at
654-55.
143. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 145-46.
144. Colville, 447 U.S. at 155.
145. Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 645.
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above, Atkinson Trading Co. struck down the imposition of the Navajo
Nation's hotel occupancy tax on rooms in a nonmember-operated hotel
located on fee simple land within the outer reservation boundaries. Justice
Rehnquist stated that "[a]n Indian tribe's sovereign power to tax whatever its derivation - reaches no further than tribal land," and in
general would not extend to activity on fee simple land even if it were
located within the reservation. 46 The opinion considered whether there
was congressional authorization to overcome the presumption against
taxing authority, and finding none, considered the facts under the Montana
framework. 4 ' Where the incidence ofthe tax falls on nonmembers who are
engaging in activity on non-Indian fee land, the Court said, the tribe may
only impose its tax if the tax falls under one of the Montana exceptions. 4
Rehnquist's application of the Montana analysis in Atkinson Trading
Co. is noteworthy for its narrow interpretation of the consent exception. To
fall under the consent exception, the relationship involved "must stem
from commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements."' 49 The
scope of the consent exception is further limited by the additional
requirement that "the tax or regulation imposed by the Indian tribe have
a nexus to the consensual relationship itself."' 5 ° To determine whether a
tax meets this requirement, it is necessary to first determine the legal
incidence of the tax, and then to consider whether the requisite nexus is
present.151
146. Id. at 653.
147. Id. at 654.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 655 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)).
150. Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 656. The opinion provided little guidance for how this
test should be applied when there are several potential consensual relationships. In Atkinson

TradingCo. there were arguably consensual relationships between the hbtel guests and the hotel;
the guests and the Navajo Nation; and the hotel and the Navajo Nation. The Court stated that the
relationship between the hotel and the Navajo Nation is irrelevant because the legal incidence of
the tax falls on the guests. Id. at 655 n.6. Some additional guidance is provided in the warning that
"[a] nonmember's consensual relationship in one area... does not trigger tribal civil authority in
another - it is not'in for a penny, in for a Pound."' Id. at 656 (citations omitted). An argument that
the tax meets this test might go as follows: guests stay at the hotel because they have chosen to
travel through Indian Country, establishing a consensual relationship with the tribe. The tribe
imposes the hotel occupancy tax on the basis of this relationship; thus, a nexus exists between the
consensual relationship and the tax. Because the opinion largely ignores the relationship between
the guests and the Navajo Nation, it neglects to explain why the relationship between the guest and
the Navajo Nation cannot support the tax.
151. See id. at 655 n.6. The Merrion Court hinted at a nexus requirement. See Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1981) ("a tribe has the power to tax nonmembers
only to the extent the nonmember enjoys the privilege of trade or other activity on the reservation
to which the tribe can attach a tax.").
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What this nexus consists of, however, is difficult to determine. The
reasoning articulated in the opinion suggests that the nexus at issue is
between: (1) the relationship between (a) the party on whom the legal
incidence of the tax falls,' 52 and (b) the tribe; and (2) the tax itself. The
Court held that the legal incidence of the hotel occupancy tax was on the
guests, not the hotel.'53 Strangely, however, the opinion contains little
discussion of whether there is an adequate nexus between the tax and the
guest-tribe relationship, except to note that the guests are nonmembers and
that they can get to the hotel by driving on non-Indian rights-of-way.'54
Instead of focusing on the nexus between the guest-tribe relationship
and the tax, the opinion considers the nexus between the hotel-tribe
relationship and the tax. This nexus is found inadequate to support
jurisdiction, leading to the tax's invalidation. Contrary to the reasoning in
Merrion, the Atkinson Trading Company's receipt of emergency services
was not enough to put the hotel under the consent exception.' The hotel's
status under the Indian trader statutes was also insufficient to create a
consensual relationship.'56
Atkinson TradingCo. hints at even greater limitations on tribal taxation
powers. First, the Court's discussion focuses on the limitations rather than
the extent of tribal powers. In Merrion, the basis of the tribe's powers lies
in its status as a sovereign power.'57 By the time of the Atkinson Trading
Co. decision, however, the doctrine of tribal sovereignty had been
weakened in a number of non-tax cases, 158 shifting the focus from the
powers vested in the tribes from before the treaty era to the limitations
subsequently imposed upon them by Congress and the courts.

152. The Atkinson Trading Co. opinion contained only a cursory explanation of the legal
incidence of the tax. Because all of the parties on which the Atkinson Trading Co. tax might fall

were nonmembers, the question of legal incidence might have been a less important issue than it
had been in other cases and therefore may have merited less extensive discussion.
153. Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 655 n.6.
154. Id. at 656-57. The implication may be that if the relationship between the hotel and the
Navajo Nation is inadequate, then the more tenuous relationship between the hotel guests and the
Navajo Nation must certainly be inadequate. It is difficult to understand this conclusion in the
absence of any analysis of the relationship between the hotel guests and the Navajo Nation. The
Court's logic on this point is also inconsistent with its insistence that each consensual relationship
be considered on a case-by-case, fact specific basis. See id. at 656 ("it is not 'in for a penny, in for
a Pound').
155. Id. at 655.
156. Id. at 657. The Indian trader statutes were held inadequate to create a consensual
relationship even though they formed the basis for preemption of state taxes imposed on a
registered Indian trader. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 135-43.
158. See supra text accompanying note 60.
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Atkinson Trading Co. hints at additional hurdles for future tribal tax
initiatives. The Court says that there must be a "substantial nexus" for the
tribe to impose on-reservation taxes on non-fee land,'5 9 a harder test than
what had been required in cases such as Merrion"6 and one that subtly
shifts analysis of taxation powers from the doctrine of sovereignty to the
fact-specific framework of Montana.This statement is dicta, however, and
given the confusing nature of the analysis in Atkinson Trading Co., it is
unclear what effect this aspect of the decision could have on subsequent
cases.
A comparison ofAtkinson Trading Co. and Merrionsuggests that land
status continues to be a significant factor for determining the extent of
tribal taxation powers over nonmembers. When a tribe attempts to tax
nonmember activity that occurs on non-reservation land, the tax will
generally be found invalid unless it has been authorized by Congress or
falls under one of the Montana exceptions, as elaborated in Atkinson
Trading Co. When the tax falls on nonmember activity that occurs on
reservation land, courts will consider a variety of factors in determining
whether the tribe has made a valid exercise of taxing authority, including
whether the nonmember has entered the tribe's jurisdiction; whether the
taxed activity implicates a significant tribal interest; and whether the
activity involves value added on the reservation.
III. STATE TAXATION

The extent of state power to tax tribal members and lands is an
important limiting factor on the ability of tribes to raise revenues and
regulate through taxation. State powers vis a vis tribes are limited by tribal
sovereign powers, sovereign immunity, and federal preemption. These
doctrines create some areas of exclusive tribal jurisdiction,' but many
159. The opinion reads:
Our reference in Merrion to a State's ability to tax activities with which it has a
substantial nexus was made in the context of describing an Indian tribe's authority
over tribal land. Only full territorial sovereigns enjoy the "power to enforce laws
against all who come within the sovereign's territory, whether citizens or aliens,"
and Indian tribes "can no longer be described as sovereign in this sense."
Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 653 n.5 (internal citations omitted).
160. The weak concept of tribal sovereignty in Atkinson Trading Co. is especially striking
when compared against early cases such as Buster v. Wright, which found tribes' taxation powers
to be based in their inherent sovereignty. Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905).
161. See, e.g., Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982) (state
may not tax contractors building schools on Navajo reservation); White Mountain Apache Tribe
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more areas of concurrent jurisdiction where state and tribal policies may
conflict and frustrate each others' regulatory and revenue-raising goals.'62
A. State Tax Power
States generally have no jurisdiction to impose taxes on members with
respect to their activities on tribal land.' 63 In McClanahan v. State Tax
Commission of Arizona," 4 the Court considered the validity of a state
income tax levied on income earned entirely on the reservation by a tribal
member living on the reservation.' 65 The tax was found invalid on the
grounds that "Indians and Indian property on an Indian reservation are not
subject to State taxation except by virtue of express authority conferred
upon the State by act of Congress."' 66 In a later decision, the Court read
this exclusion broadly, finding that the standard would apply to tribal
members living anywhere in Indian Country, including on fee simple
land.'67 This is different from the approach taken in cases about tribal
taxation powers over nonmembers, which limit tribal jurisdiction to trust
land. 6 While preemption served as the framework of analysis, rather than
tribal sovereignty, McClanahan noted that sovereignty nonetheless
169
remained relevant as a "backdrop" for interpreting treaties and statutes.
The opinion created strong immunities from state taxation that rested on
v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (state may not impose taxes on logging company that operates
solely on tribal land).
162. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (both the tribe
and the state may impose severance taxes on natural resource production by nonmembers);
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (both
the tribe and the state may impose cigarette taxes on sales occurring within the reservation).
163. Carleton, supra note 79, at 256.
164. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
165. Id. at 165-66.
166. Id. at 171 (internal citations omitted). In subsequent cases, McClanahan has been cited
for the proposition that states may not tax Indian reservation lands unless Congress has granted
such authority. See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
167. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 124-25 (1993). The Court
remanded the case to determine "whether the relevant tribal members live in Indian Country -whether the land is within reservation boundaries, on allotted lands, or in dependent communities."
Id. at 126.
168. For example, under the holding in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac & FoxNation, the
state of Arizona could not tax income earned by members of the Navajo Nation while working at
the hotel operated on fee simple land by the Atkinson Trading Company. Sac & Fox Nation, 508
U.S. at 121-28. Under the holding in Atkinson TradingCo., the tribe cannot tax the nonmembers
who stay at the hotel. Thus neither the state nor the tribe may exercise its taxation powers to their
full extent on fee simple land within the reservation boundaries. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,
532 U.S. 645, 645 (2001).
169. McClanahan,411 U.S. at 172.
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a foundation of both federal involvement in tribal life and tribal
sovereignty. Most importantly, McClanahan assumed that tribes as
sovereign entities have an interest in freedom from state intervention.
Members retain some minimal level of immunity from state taxation
when they engage in activity off of reservation land. The Supreme Court
repeatedly has held that states may not impose car excise taxes on cars that
belong to members who reside on reservations, even if the cars have offreservation use.' 70 These decisions have been qualified, however, by the
suggestion that states might be able to impose vehicle excise taxes that are
tailored to tax only off-reservation use. 71 The question has never been
directly addressed, and it is noteworthy that an otherwise invalid state tax
on on-reservation, member activity cannot be corrected merely by
expanding the tax's scope to off-reservation activity.
In general, however, state tax immunity is lost when tribal members
work or live off the reservation and when tribal enterprises operate off the
reservation.172 The Court considered the latter issue in MescaleroApache
Tribe v. Jones,' which involved sales and use taxes imposed by New
Mexico on a ski resort operated by the tribe on off-reservation land that the
Court treated as trust land. 7 4 The Court noted that "[a]bsent express
federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries
have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise
applicable to all citizens of the State."' 75 As a general matter, the tribe's
enterprise was subject to the same state taxes as nontribal enterprises.7
The situation in MescaleroApache Tribe was more complicated than the
general case, however, because the ski resort had been developed under
170. See Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. at 114; Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); Moe v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead
Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
171. See Sac & FoxNation, 508 U.S. at 127; Colville, 447 U.S. at 163. It is difficult to imagine
how such a tax would be designed, since it would be difficult to evaluate exactly how much offreservation use is made of any particular vehicle.
172. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995). However, there may
be an exception when state taxes implicate tribal self-government, as when tribal employees who
live off the reservation are taxed by the state. See id.
at 464-65.
173. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
174. The land was not technically held in trust, but was leased to the tribe by the federal
government. See id. at 156 n. 11.
175. Id. at 148. The standard was tightened in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, in which the Court noted, "our cases reveal a consistent
practice of declining to find that Congress has authorized state taxation unless it has 'made its
intention to do so unmistakably clear."' County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 258 (1992) (quoting Montanav. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S.
759, 765 (1985)).
176. See Jones, 411 U.S. at 148-49.
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the Indian Reorganization Act.'77 The Act exempts lands taken into trust
from state taxation, but the Court found that neither the statute's plain
language nor its legislative history created an exemption for income earned
on non-reservation trust land. 7 ' Trust property and permanent
improvements to trust property were exempt from state taxation, but the
income earned from the property was not exempt.
States may impose taxes on land that was allotted under the General
Allotment Act. In County of Yakima v. ConfederatedTribes andBands of
the Yakima Indian Nation,'79 the Court analyzed sections 5 and 6 of the
General Allotment Act and found that the statute gave the county the
authority to impose an in rem, ad valorem property tax on patented fee
land held by members, but not an excise tax on sales of the same land." 0
The Court began with the rule that congressional authorization is necessary
for a state to tax tribal lands or tribal members, and then considered how
the General Allotment Act, Burke Act, and Indian Reorganization Act
each affected the tax status of the land involved.' The Court agreed with
the County that section 6 of the General Allotment Act gave it authority
to tax fee-patented land, and that the Burke Act reinforced that statutory
power.'82 The Court found an implicit connection between pre-allotment
restrictions on alienability and pre-allotment restraints on state and local
taxation, determining that Congress must have intended to make allottees
subject to taxes on their land once their enjoyment of their property no
longer was limited by restraints on alienation.8 3 Therefore, section 5 of the
General Allotment Act, which removed restraints on alienability of
patented land, was read as additional evidence that allotted land was
subject to state taxes. 4 Finally, the Court found that the patented land's
new tax status did not change with the shift in Congress's approach to
Indian affairs, as manifested by the Indian Reorganization Act, because by
freezing the current state of affairs, Congress left previously allotted land
177. Id. at 146.
178. Id. at 155, 157.
179. Yakima IndianNation, 502 U.S. at 251.
180. Id. at 270.
181. Id. at 258.
182. Id. at 258-59.
183. Id. at263-64.
184. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. at 263-64. This section of the Yakima Indian Nation
opinion rested on a 1906 case, Goudy v. Meath, 203 U.S. 146 (1906). Citing Goudy, Justice Scalia
explained for the majority that sections 5 and 6 would appear to be inconsistent if section 5 gave
allottees the ability to alienate their land free from federal restrictions, but section 6 failed to
empower the states to tax the freely-alienable, allotted land. Yakima IndianNation, 502 U.S. at 263.
"Thus, when § 5 rendered the allotted lands alienable and encumberable, it also rendered them
subject to assessment and forced sale for taxes." Id.
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"fully alienable by the allottees, their heirs, and assigns ... " and thus
"chose not to terminate state taxation upon those lands as well." ' 5
While the specific holding of Yakima IndianNation may be limited to
land distributed under the General Allotment Act, the case also suggests
that the validity of state taxes on land within Indian Country may depend
in part on whether they assert in rem or in personam jurisdiction. The
Yakima Indian Nation complained that the in rem, ad valorem tax would
interfere with its self-determination and self-governance. 16 Justice Scalia
responded that while an in personam tax might implicate such concerns,
an in rem tax was less problematic." 7 Another section of the opinion notes
that an in rem tax "creates a burden on the property alone."' 8 Although
technically true, this ignores the fact that the individual allottees need to
make tax payments in order to prevent the state from foreclosing on their
land.'89 Many allottees have lost their land because they could not pay state
taxes, and the Yakima Indian Nation dispute entered litigation when the
County began foreclosing on properties it claimed owed taxes.' 9
Nonetheless, the Court held that the county's in rem, ad valorem property
tax did not threaten self-determination and was allowed pursuant to the
authority granted by the General Allotment Act.' 9
By contrast, an excise tax imposed on sales of the same lands was not
"taxation of... land" under the Act, and therefore was not allowed.'92
Interestingly, the Court found that the in rem nature of the excise tax did
not cure its invalidity. This is a peculiar conclusion given the significance
of the in rem/in personam distinction with regard to the ad valorem tax;
while the factor is relevant, it apparently is not determinative of whether
a state tax on tribal lands intrudes impermissibly on tribal sovereignty.
As legal scholar Scott Taylor noted in his examination of the case, it
was peculiar for the Supreme Court to weigh the legislative intent behind
the General Allotment Act, given that the purposes of that statute have
since been completely repudiated by Congress and recognized more
widely as misguided policy. '93 Because the General Allotment Act aimed
to eliminate the tribes' political status, its provisions showed no deference
185. Id. at 264.
186. Id. at 265.
187. Id. at 266. Many allottees lost their land because they could not pay state taxes. Taylor,
supra note 15, at 68.
188. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. at 266.
189. Id.
190. Taylor, supra note 15, at 68. See Yahima IndianNation, 502 U.S. at 256.
191. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. at 266.
192. Id. at 269-70 (quoting Indian General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 348-49).
193. See Taylor, supra note 15, at 83.
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to tribal sovereignty. 194 With the Indian Reorganization Act, however,
Congress's purposes with respect to Indian policy "[returned] to the
principles of tribal self-determination and self-governance which had
characterized the pre-Dawes Act era."' 95 While Congress froze the status
of previously-allotted lands when it passed the Indian Reorganization Act,
it nonetheless changed its overall approach to Indian policy, and this
change should be taken into consideration when determining the effect of
the Indian Reorganization Act on allotted lands. 196 Congress's
unwillingness to undertake the practical difficulties of undoing allotments
made over several decades does not also indicate an unwillingness to make
the more easily administrable shift to pre-allotment tax status for allotted
lands.9

Another criticism of Yakima IndianNation is that it fails to distinguish
between allotted lands held by individual Indians and lands held by
tribes.' 8 As Taylor has explained, the General Allotment Act failed to
distinguish between these two types of ownership because Congress
anticipated that the tribes soon would cease to exist as political entities. 99
Because this policy was eliminated with the Indian Reorganization Act,
any residual effect of the General Allotment Act on tax power over allotted
lands should be limited to land held by individuals in order to prevent
encroachment on tribal sovereignty by permitting state taxation of tribal
lands.2 °°
194. See id.

195. Yakima IndianNation, 502 U.S. at 255.
196. See Taylor, supra note 15, at 83.
197. The Yakima IndianNation opinion suggested that it would be very difficult to administer

a tax only on land held in fee simple by nonmembers. The Court used this point to bolster its
argument in favor of applying the tax to all fee-patented land regardless of ownership. Yakima
Indian Nation, 502 U.S. at 265. The Court suggests that determining whether someone who owns
fee-patented land is a member of the tribe would be more challenging than "tak[ing] account of
immunities or exemptions enjoyed, for example, by federally owned, state owned, and churchowned lands." Id. It is not clear why the tax assessor's job under the Yakima Indian Nation's
proposed regime would be so much more complicated, nor is it obvious why the difference in
administrability should influence the extent of state power over tribal members.
198. See Taylor, supra note 15, at 83. The cases discussed in this Article that challenge state
taxes imposed against tribal businesses were initiated by the tribes. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v.
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 453 (1995); Yakima IndianNation, 502 U.S. at 256. However,
Yakima IndianNation indicates that prior to the tribe's filing, the county had begun to foreclose on
properties owned by the tribe. See id.
199. Taylor, supra note 15, at 83.
200. See id. at 83-84. The Court will have the opportunity to address state tax authority over
certain categories of tribal land when it hears Oneida Indian Nation v. Sherrill, 124 S.Ct. 2904
(2004), cert. granted.The case involves a property tax imposed by the City of Sherrill, New York
on land that the Oneida Indian Nation bought in the 1990s. Oneida Indian Nation v. Sherrill, 337
F.3d 139, 144 (2d Cir. 2003). The land had been designated reservation land by the 1794 Treaty
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Sovereign immunity may provide an additional protection to tribes,
although it is unclear whether tribal landholdings would be sheltered from
in rem actions to collect taxes. The discussion in Yakima Indian Nation
suggests that in rem actions against property within the reservation do not
generally implicate tribal sovereignty to the same extent as actions in
personam, suggesting that perhaps tribal sovereign immunity might also
be weaker for in rem actions. Sovereignty and sovereign immunity are
distinct issues, however, and the Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions
on in rem jurisdiction lend some support to the contention that sovereign
immunity should be extended to in rem actions against property held by
tribes.2"'
B. Legal Incidence Versus Economic Burden
The concept of legal incidence attempts to capture who pays a tax for
purposes of determining the tax's jurisdictional implications. A key issue
in both state taxation of Indian and tribal interests and tribal taxation of
nonmembers is determining whether the legal incidence of a tax falls on
individual Indians or tribes, or whether it falls elsewhere. The state may
not tax "reservation land or reservation Indians" in the absence of clear
federal authorization, so the legal incidence determination may be
dispositive as to whether a state tax is valid. 0 2 It also may be dispositive
as to the validity of a tribal tax, because while tribes have full power to
impose taxes on member activity on the reservation, they may only impose

of Canandaigua, but was illegally sold without federal approval in the first decade of the nineteenth
century. Id. The Second Circuit found that the land is reservation land and that the state lacked
authority to tax the land. Id. at 167.
201. The Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions on in rem jurisdiction are discussed in
RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1036,982 n.7 (5th ed. 2003). In FloridaDepartmentofState v. TreasureSalvors, Inc., the
Court held that the federal district court could not "adjudicate the State's interest in the [contested]
property without the State's consent." Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670,
682 (1992). However, the Court also found that a suit against the officers, who lacked "colorable
basis on which to retain possession" of the property, was valid. Id. In Gardner v. New Jersey, the
Court found that there was no "prohibited suit against the State" when a reorganization court in a
bankruptcy action heard the trustee's petition asking for adjudication of disputed tax liabilities after
the state had filed a claim for taxes owed. Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 571 (1947). The
holding was limited in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postseconday Educational
Expense Board, to stand for the proposition "that a state waives its sovereign immunity by
voluntarily invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts." Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 681, n.3 (1999); see also FALLON ET AL., supra,
at 982 n.7.
202. See Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 458 (quoting Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. at 258).
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taxes on nonmember activity on fee land if authorized by congressional
statute or if one of the Montana exceptions applies.2 °3
As a preliminary matter, it may be helpful to consider the ways in
which taxation constitutes an exercise of sovereign power over different
economic actors. Taxation is an exercise of jurisdictional authority over
certain persons and entities who are required to pay money to the state.
Taxes affect purchaser welfare, because once a tax is imposed, purchasers
either pay more or purchase less, or some combination of the two. Sellers
may collect less of a profit on each sale, complete fewer sales overall, or
even conduct fewer transactions at lower prices. The key determinants of
who pays more and earns less are the elasticities of supply and demand,
regardless of who the law holds criminally or civilly liable for
nonpayment.
The imposition of tax liability also has effects beyond those parties
whose economic interactions are directly affected. For example, tax
provisions may impose incidental burdens in the form of transaction costs,
such as collection and reporting responsibilities. These costs can be
viewed as an exercise of jurisdiction over the parties who are required to
pay them.
Taxes are also a more general expression of the sovereign will. The
revenue raised by taxes supports government's basic existence and
facilitates the exercise of sovereign power. Taxes may be imposed to pull
resources from one sector of the economy and move them to another, or
to support high priority governmental programs. Revenue measures may
be designed to attract investment to a specific segment of the economy or
to the economy as a whole. Conversely, revenue measures may be shaped
to dissuade consumer spending on particular kinds of items or to limit
investment in particular sectors.
Because sovereignty is so strongly and intricately linked with the
power to tax, only a nuanced legal doctrine can effectively capture the
impact of state taxes on tribal sovereignty. Ideally, the operative test of a
tax's incidence would roughly approximate economic burden, and Courts
would consider how state and tribal taxes actually impact tribal consumers,
retailers, and the effectiveness of tribal economic policy. In fact, the Court
has developed a legal incidence test that is highly textual and gives greater
weight to statutory construction than to economic reality, permitting states
to impose their revenue measures in a manner that impedes tribal
autonomy.
203. Interestingly, the legal incidence of a tax does not appear to affect a plaintiff's standing
to challenge the tax. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 654 n.6 (2001) (legal

incidence of tax is on hotel guests rather than petitioner).
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The Supreme Court has found that the legal incidence of a tax falls on
non-Indians even when there is a strong argument that tribes or individual
Indians are economically burdened.2" Legal incidence is an absolute
concept that presumes that the tax falls all on one party, failing to capture
the broad impact state taxes have on both nonmembers and members,
consumers and retailers. Justice Ginsburg has argued that a legal incidence
test provides greater certainty to the states,205 but the manner in which it
is applied keeps tribes guessing about the reach of their taxation powers.
This section will consider how the Court has approached the legal
incidence analysis in three cases:. Moe v. Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation,2 6 Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,2°7 and Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. ChickasawNation.20 8
1. Defining and Applying Legal Incidence
An early example of legal incidence analysis can be found in Moe v.
ConfederatedSalish andKootenai Tribes.2 °9 Moe examined the validity of
a number of state taxes that had been imposed on tribal members. The
Court cited the Supremacy Clause to invalidate a tax on personal property
located within the reservation, a vendor license fee applied to a tribal
member selling cigarettes for the tribes on tribal land, and a cigarette tax
applied to sales between Indians.21° It refused, however, to invalidate a
state cigarette tax imposed on sales by the Indian retailer to non-Indian
consumers, concluding that the legal incidence of the tax fell on the nonIndians and therefore was permissible.
The Court focused its tax incidence analysis on the language of the
statute and criminal liability for nonpayment. The statute's plain language
stated that the tax was imposed on consumers, not retailers: "the cigarette
tax 'shall be conclusively presumed to be [a] direct [tax] on the retail
2
consumer precollected for the purpose ofconvenience and facility only." ll
The provision also made it a misdemeanor for a retail purchaser to fail to
pay the tax altogether.21 2 In theory, the purchaser could avoid criminal
liability by paying the tax directly to the state after purchase, rather than
204. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 460 (1995).
425 U.S. 463 (1976).
447 U.S. 134 (1979).
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 450.
Moe,425 U.S. at 463.
Id.at 480-81.
Id.at 482.
Id.
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through the retailer at the time of purchase.2" 3 The Court made the obvious
prediction, however, that "[w]ithout the simple expedient of having the
retailer collect the sales tax from non-Indian purchasers... wholesale
violations of the law by the latter class will go virtually unchecked."214
While focusing on the consumer's liability, the Court ignored the risk
of criminal prosecution faced by retailers who failed to cooperate with the
tax scheme. The statute required retailers to "precollect" the cigarette tax
by paying the tax themselves when they purchased the cigarettes from
their suppliers.215 The retailers faced criminal liability for failure to comply
with this aspect of the tax statute." 6 In fact, the smokeshop owner whose
actions were at issue in Moe had been arrested along with another Indian
who worked at the smokeshop "for failure to possess a cigarette retailer's
license and for selling nontax-stamped cigarettes, both misdemeanors
under Montana law."2 7
The discussion in Moe fails to acknowledge the nuances of economic
burden and tribal sovereignty because it treats tax incidence as an "all-ornothing" issue. The Court notes that the state tax affects the comparative
advantage of tribal retailers, but rejects the tribes' argument that the Indian
retailer bears the tax, deferring instead to the District Court's finding that
the consumer ultimately benefits from nonpayment.2"' The precollection
requirement is not a tax at all, the Court rules, concluding that the scheme
neither "frustrates tribal self-government" nor "runs afoul of any
congressional enactment dealing with the affairs of reservation
Indians.
,219
Moe ignores the detrimental impact of the state taxes on both onreservation business and tribal tax power. Ordinarily, sovereign powers
may decide to promote economic development by enacting tax plans that
attract consumers who might otherwise bring their noney elsewhere.
Sovereigns also may choose to raise revenue or regulate consumption by
increasing taxes on certain goods. Tribal powers are limited, however, by
the requirement that tribal members comply with taxes imposed by state
governments. Practically speaking, this means that tribal retail income falls
and that tribal economic policy suffers. Non-Indian consumers are worse
off after Moe because they no longer can avoid taxes by making their
purchases from tribal retailers. The retailers are also worse off, however,
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
Moe, 425 U.S. at 482.
Id. at 468 n.6, 481.
Id. at 467.
Id.
Id. at 481.
Moe, 425 U.S. at 483.
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because they lose non-Indian consumers, and Moe ignores this impact of
taxes on tribal interests. Furthermore, Moe gives the states control over
tribal tax power because legal incidence depends heavily on textual
analysis of state statutes.
The Moe Court purported to base the legal incidence analysis on
objective factors without considering who could bear the incidence under
the law. In Colville, however, the analysis takes into consideration not only
on whom the tax actually falls, but also on whom the law permits the tax
to fall. As with Moe, Colville involved the on-reservation sale of cigarettes
to nonmembers by members who were not collecting state tax. Colville,
however, included the added dimension of a competing tribal tax on
cigarettes.220 The Court extended its reasoning from Moe to find that sales
by tribal members to nonmembers on reservation land were not exempt
from state cigarette taxes despite the tribes' revenue programs.2 2 1
Washington's cigarette excise tax consisted of a levy of "$1.60 per
carton on the 'sale, use, consumption, handling, possession or distribution'
' The state enforced the tax by affixing
of cigarettes within the State."222
stamps to cigarettes and permitting only the stamped cigarettes to be
sold.223 The revenue measure included an exemption for sales by Indian
tribes to tribal members.224 In addition to the excise tax, the state also
imposed its five percent sales tax on cigarettes, which the Court
characterized as "collected from the purchaser by the retailer., 225 Like the
excise tax, the sales tax also included an exemption for on-reservation
sales to tribal members.226
There were four tribes involved in the Colville litigation, with three
imposing similar taxes on cigarette sales.227 These tribes had enacted tribal
ordinances, approved by the Secretary of the Interior, that authorized
certain on-reservation retailers to sell tobacco.2 28
All three Tribes distribute the cigarettes to the tobacco outlets and
collect from the operators of those outlets both the wholesale
220. Washington v. Confederated Tribes ofthe Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 151
(1980). The tax at issue in Colville also imposed a recording burden on the member retailers in
addition to the burden of collecting the tax. Id.
221. Id. at 161.
222. Id. at 141 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 82.24.020 (1976)).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Colville, 447 U.S. at 142.
226. The Court stated that the sales tax "does not apply to on-reservation sales to reservation
Indians." Id.

227. Id. at 144.
228. Id. The retailers were also federally-licensed Indian traders. Id.
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distribution price and a tax of forty to fifty cents per carton. The
cigarettes remain the property of the Tribe until sale. The taxing
ordinancesspecify that the tax is to be passed on to the ultimate
consumer of the cigarettes.229
The Court determined on the basis of this language that the incidence of
the Colville, Lummi and Makah taxes was on the consumer, not the
retailer.23 °
The fourth tribe involved in the case, the Yakima Tribe, bought
cigarettes at wholesale and then sold them to licensed retailers, collecting
a markup and a tax of 22.50 per carton.2 3' The Court specified that the
Yakima ordinance did not require that this tax be added to the selling
price, and therefore concluded that the tax fell on the retailer.232
Thus the incidence of the tribal taxes was determined through a close
reading of the statutory language, as legal incidence had been determined
in Moe. This analysis in Colville suffered from the same basic failings as
the reasoning in Moe. Once again, the Court failed to construct a legal
incidence test that might approximate economic burden or meaningfully
gauge the significance of tribal taxing powers to tribal sovereignty. Thus,
although the Court upheld the tribes' power to impose tribal taxes on
nonmember purchasers, it undercut its own ruling by also requiring
nonmember consumers to pay state taxes.
In addition, there is an internal inconsistency in the Court's analysis of
legal incidence in Colville, because the state tax is considered in a different
manner from how the tribal taxes are considered. Instead of conducting its
own analysis of legal incidence of the state tax, the Court relied on the
district court's finding that the cigarette excise tax falls on the purchaser.233
It also adopted the district court's circular reasoning that "the tax falls
upon the first event which may constitutionally be subjected to it. '234 In
other words, if the true legal incidence of the tax is on an Indian who
cannot be taxed by the state, then the legal incidence will be shifted to the
next party down the chain of commerce on whom the tax may be imposed.
Thus, "where the wholesaler or retailer is an Indian on whom the tax
cannot be imposed under McClanahan.. ., the first taxable event is the
229. Id.
230. Colville, 447 U.S. at 152 n.28.
231. Id. at 144-45. The Court suggested that the markup collected by the Yakima Tribe
distinguished its cigarette sales scheme from those of the Colville, Lummi, and Makah tribes. The
Court suggested that these three tribes acted as retailers rather than as wholesalers. Id.
232. Id. at 145, 152 n.28.
233. Id. at 142.
234. Id. n.9.
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use, consumption, or possession by the non-Indian purchaser. '"235
Accordingly, the Court determined that the state taxes could be imposed
on nonmember purchasers, even though the tribal retailers and wholesalers
were economically burdened by the tax. The "first taxable event" test
ignores the true economic burden altogether.
The Court returned to a Moe-like legal incidence analysis in Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation,236 which struck down an excise tax
that Oklahoma had imposed on fuel sold on the reservation by Chickasaw
Nation retailers to both members and nonmembers. 2" The test set forth in
Justice Ginsburg's opinion was intended to determine whether a state tax
had been levied "directly on an Indian tribe or its members inside Indian
Country, rather than on non-Indians.""23 If the tax fell on non-Indians, then
the Court would balance federal, state, and tribal interests to determine
whether the tax was permissible. 2" If the tax fell on the tribe or its
members, however, then the tax would be invalidated in the absence of
cession ofjurisdiction or an authorizing federal statute.24 °
Justice Ginsburg's opinion first asked whether the statute expressly
stated who would bear the legal incidence of the tax.24 ' A related question
was whether the statute contained a "'pass through' provision, requiring
distributors and retailers to pass on the tax's cost to consumers," which
would indicate that the legal incidence fell on the consumers.242 In the case
of the Oklahoma statute, however, Justice Ginsburg found that the statute's
plain language did not determine its legal incidence.
When the statute fails to provide explicit guidance, then "the question
is one of 'fair interpretation of the taxing statute as written and
applied.' 2 43 A number of factors indicated that the legal incidence of the
Oklahoma tax fell on retailers, rather than distributors or customers.
Oklahoma law stated that fuel distributors must "remit" the tax "on behalf
of a licensed retailer," suggesting that the tax itself falls on the retailer
rather than the distributor.2 44 The tax was imposed on sales from
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Colville, 447 U.S. at 142 n.9 (foll citation omitted).
515 U.S. 450 (1995).
Id. at 453.
Id. at 458.
Id.
Id.
ChickasawNation, 515 U.S. at 461.
Id. Justice Ginsburg quoted the statute in Moe, which said that the tax "shall be

conclusively presumed to be [a] direct [tax] on the retail consumer precollected for the purpose of
convenience and facility only." Id. (quoting Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425
U.S. 463, 482 (1976)).
243. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
244. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 505(c) (1991)).
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distributors to retailers, but not on sales between distributors.245
Distributors who were unable to collect prepaid taxes from their retailers
could subtract the uncollected amount from future payments to the state.246
Oklahoma permitted distributors to retain a portion of the tax collected,
indicating that the distributor was acting as an agent on behalf of the
state.2 47 The Court noted that the tax provision contained no indication that
the retailers might be acting as collection agents vis t vis consumers, and
that liability24for
nonpayment rested on distributors and retailers, but not on
8
consumers.

The approach outlined in Chickasaw Nation is primarily textual, and
Justice Ginsburg notes that Oklahoma could bring its tax provision into
compliance with the opinion merely by amending the law to state
explicitly that the legal incidence falls on nonmember consumers.2 49 This
approach oversimplifies tribal rights to be free from state taxation by
turning the question into one of statutory drafting. At the same time,
however, it provides clear guidance as to the language tribal governments
should push to have included in state tax provisions so as to maintain the
tax advantages for tribal businesses. Of course, having a textually-based
test also makes it easier for non-tribal retailers to lobby for language that
will prevent any tax advantage from accruing to competing tribal retailers.
It is unclear whether the objective factor approach outlined in
Chickasaw replaces the circular first taxable event test. The Chickasaw
Court did not explicitly overrule Colville, but distinguished the case on the
grounds that Colville dealt with state taxation of non-Indians, whereas
Chickasaw involved a state tax on Indians.25 ° Presumably, however, the
Chickasaw approach will be applied in the future when the Court makes
legal incidence determinations.
2. The Economic Burden Alternative to the Legal Incidence Test
Prior to adopting and defining the legal incidence test, the Court flirted
with an economic burden test to determine the validity of state taxes on
tribal retailers who conducted transactions with nonmembers at onreservation stores. In Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax
Commission,2 5' the Court considered the burden of a state tax on income
245. Id.
246. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 461.
247. Id. at 462.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 460. In fact, the Oklahoma legislature tried, but failed to enact such a provision
prior to the Chickasaw Nation decision. Id. at 460 n. 10.
250. Id. at 459 n.8.
251. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).

386
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earned by a licensed Indian trader selling goods to Indians on reservation
land.252 The Court held the Arizona tax invalid to the extent that it was
"applied to this federally licensed Indian trader with respect to sales made
to reservation Indians on the reservation," because this would impose a
burden on Indian traders that would interfere with the congressional
purpose of "protect[ing] Indians against prices deemed unfair or
unreasonable. 253 While the statutory language focused on the Indian
trader, the Court nonetheless saw a threat that Indian customers would
ultimately
bear the burden of the tax, and invalidated the tax on that
254
ground.
Economic burden formed the basis of analysis in two other cases
striking down state taxes that were imposed on nonmember, on-reservation
activity. In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,25 the Court
conducted a preemption analysis to conclude that the state could not
impose a motor carrier license tax or use fuel tax on a corporation
operating only on the reservation.256 The Court did not discuss the legal
incidence of the tax, but it did note that the economic burden of the tax fell
on the tribe and suggested that this was a relevant factor in the preemption
analysis. 257 The Court cited this decision in Ramah Navajo School Board,
Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico 251 when it rejected the state's
suggestion that the legal incidence test be applied.259 Justice Marshall's
majority opinion noted that a tax's legal incidence might sometimes be
significant in determining whether or not it is valid. Even though the test
would have weighed in favor of the state, "[g]iven the comprehensive
federal regulatory scheme at issue.. .," the Court "decline[d] to allow the
State to impose additional burdens on the significant federal interest...
even if those burdens are imposed indirectly through a tax on a non-Indian
contractor for work done on the reservation. 26 °
The economic burden analysis is sensible because it focuses on how
taxes affect both individual Indians and broader tribal interests. It provides
a more nuanced examination of how taxes affect interactions between
businesses, consumers, and the sovereign power. This is because it
recognizes that neither statutory language nor criminal liability will
252. Id. at 685-86.
253. Id. at 691-92.

254. Id. The tax was imposed on two percent of "gross proceeds of sales, or gross income" of
the trading post. Id. at 685.
255. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
256. Id. at 138.
257. Id. at 151 n.15.
258. 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
259. Id. at 844 n.8.
260. Id.
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necessarily reflect the true impact of taxation, and it permits courts to
consider how a single tax can impact multiple economic actors through
both price and sales volume.
Economic burden analysis also encompasses the idea that a tax may
impact general business decisions that ultimately affect tribal welfare. For
example, in Warren Trading Post, the Court's preemption analysis
regarding the Indian trader statutes reflects a general concern about the
impact of the state tax on the federal government's ability to protect
Indians from economic exploitation.26 ' If the government's ability to meet
these obligations were weakened, then economic welfare would suffer
generally, regardless of the technical legal incidence of the tax in any
particular case.
One drawback of an economic burden test is that its flexibility may
result in selective consideration of a tax's effects. For example, Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico262 addressed the question of whether the
state could impose a severance tax on a company that had entered into
mineral and gas leases with the tribe.263 If such a tax raises costs so that oil
and gas production on the reservation is no longer profitable, or is less
profitable than it would be at alternative sites, then the company will
choose to reduce its on-reservation operations. This reduction would hurt
the tribe's economic interests by reducing jobs, investment in tribal
infrastructure, and tribal tax revenues. Thus the burden of the tax may fall
on both the non-Indian companies and the tribe. It need not fall entirely on
one or the other.
The Cotton Petroleum opinion did not address the legal incidence of
the tax, but to distinguish the case from two earlier cases in which state
taxes had been found invalid, it cited the district court's finding that the
severance tax imposed no economic burden on the tribe.264 As further
evidence that the burden fell on non-Indians, the Court cited the fact that
amicus briefs had been filed by a number of oil and gas companies.265
There is language in the opinion recognizing that the tax imposes some
burden on tribal revenues, but these effects are disregarded in the final
analysis.266 The Court considered unimportant the possibility that the state
261. See Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 690-92 (1965).
262. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
263. Id. at 166.
264. Id. at 185.
265. Id. at 187 n.18.
266. The Court stated that, while it agreed with Cotton Petroleum "that apurpose of the 1938
[Indian Mineral Leasing] Act is to provide Indian tribes with badly needed revenue," it found "no
evidence for the further supposition that Congress intended to remove all barriers to profit
maximization," such as state taxation. Id. at 180. The opinion also notes, however, that Cotton
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severance tax might reduce income for both the companies and the tribe
by raising the cost of mineral exploitation on the reservation. Despite the
nature of the consideration of economic burden in Cotton Petroleum,
however, a formal economic burden test could leave room to consider
burdens on multiple parties, and thus could be fairer than a legal incidence
test.
Justice Ginsburg questioned the usefulness of economic burden
analysis in her Chickasaw opinion, stating that "[t]he factors that would
enter into an inquiry... are daunting."267 She argued that legal incidence
provides a more predictable test that improves the administrability of state
tax programs, even if it fails to accommodate the full scope of the effects
that taxes can have.268 It is undoubtedly easier for states to predict their
revenues if they can draft their own tax authority into their statutes.
However, the text-based legal incidence test ignores the complex balance
between federal, state, and tribal powers and abdicates the Court's
authority over the daunting task of preserving tribal rights. While it would
be complicated for the Court to make determinations about "how
completely retailers can pass along tax increases without sacrificing sales
volume, ' 26 9 the Court could rely on fact finding by district courts, as it has
with regard to legal incidence in Moe and Colville. An economic burden
test would provide the flexibility necessary to rule on the validity of state
and tribal taxes in a manner that preserves tribal powers.
It perhaps is not surprising that the Court has abandoned the economic
burden test in favor of the legal incidence test, because the shift shadows
the general trend of reigning in tribal authority. Legal incidence analysis
gives states almost complete control over whether their revenue measures
apply on reservation land, since the validity of state tax provisions is
determined on the basis of statutory language rather than economic impact.
Accordingly, tribes have a more difficult time implementing fiscal policy
to steer economic development and raise revenue to fund governmental
operations.

Petroleum was not "a case in which an unusually large state tax has imposed a substantial burden
on the Tribe." Id. at 186.
267. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 460 (1995). The opinion
continues: "Ifwe were to make 'economic reality' our guide, we might be obliged to consider, for
example, how completely retailers can pass along tax increases without sacrificing sales volume -a complicated matter dependent on the characteristics of the market for the relevant product." Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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IV.

RECLAIMING TAXATION POWERS

This patchwork of Supreme Court decisions leaves many unanswered
questions about the extent of tribal taxation powers. Tribes' sovereign
powers to tax have been significantly curtailed by opinions that broadly
interpret state jurisdiction and narrowly interpret tribal jurisdiction. While
some of the new limitations are clearly stated, the extent to which tribes
may tax nonmembers remains poorly defined.
Tribal policymakers must consider two questions in particular when
designing new tax programs. First, they must consider whether the tax can
be designed to preempt competing taxes imposed by the state. Preemption
remains crucial to maintaining a tax's effectiveness within the reservation.
The second question is whether the tax falls under one of the Montana
exceptions, since the Montana framework will determine the legitimacy
of tribal taxes on nonmembers on fee simple land.27° Although the
exceptions have been applied somewhat inconsistently from case to case,
there nonetheless are certain guidelines about what constitutes consent and
what implicates a tribe's political integrity, economic security, health or
welfare. The first and second questions are closely related because some
factors that are relevant to preemption analysis are related to tribal selfgovernance and may therefore bring the tax under the second Montana
exception.
A. Preemption
Preemption in Indian law cases is different from ordinary preemption
" ' The Court
and is determined in a flexible, fact-specific manner.27
considers tribal interests in addition to federal and state interests, as well
as the "broad policies that underlie the legislation and the history of tribal
' Federal preemption of state taxes
independence in the field at issue."272
need not be express, and all statutory ambiguities are resolved in favor of
the tribes.27 The test's malleability has resulted in standards that are
difficult to satisfy in practice. Statutes and treaties dealing generally with
self-governance and economic development are not enough to preempt
state taxes.274 Even when federal statutes specifically address state taxation
270. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 654 (2001).
271. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 176.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 176-77.
274. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
155 (1980) (rejecting tribe's preemption arguments with respect to the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934, the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Indian trader
statutes, and a number of treaties).
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of tribal interests, the Court has been reluctant to find preemption in the
that the statute specifically anticipated a particular tax
absence of2evidence
5
provision. 1

Several pre-Atkinson Trading Co. cases held state taxes invalid on
preemption grounds. In Warren TradingPost,the Court held that federal
Indian trader statutes preempted the imposition of a state sales tax on a
licensed Indian trader located on the reservation whose customers were
tribal members.276 Although the holding with respect to the Indian trader
regulatory scheme has been limited by subsequent decisions,277 the case
sets forth a list of factors that are relevant to preemption analysis. The long
history of the Indian trader statutes is deemed significant, as is the
exclusivity and breadth of powers granted to the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs.27 The Court also considers the Commissioner's promulgation of
extensive regulations "prescribing in the most minute fashion" licensing
requirements and procedures, punishments for unlicensed trading, and
what traders may
sell to Indians, in addition to disallowing certain conduct
279
at trading posts.

275. See id. at 156 (the intent of the Washington Enabling Act that the state would not tax
reservation land or income derived from reservation lands does not preempt state taxes "assessed
against nonmembers of the Tribes [that] concern transactions in personalty with no substantial
connection to reservation lands.").
276. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965).
277. Atkinson Trading Co. held that "'Indian trader' status by itself cannot support the
imposition of the hotel occupancy tax" on nonmember guests of a hotel situated on non-fee land.
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645,656 (2001). Similarly, in Departmentof Taxation
and Financev. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., the Court upheld a state scheme limiting the number
of unstamped cigarettes that wholesalers could sell to Indian retailers, noting that the Indian trader
statutes did not preempt the state-imposed quotas. Dep't of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea &
Bros. Inc., 512 U.S. 61, 70-71 (1994).
278. Warren TradingPost Co., 380 U.S. at 687-89. The first Indian trader statute passed in
1790 and required that Indian traders be licensed by the federal government. An 1876 statute
(Federal Indian Law 94-138, 373-381) gives the Commissioner of Indian Affairs the "'sole power
and authority to appoint traders to the Indian tribes."' Id. at 688-89 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 261
(1958)). In addition, the Commissioner has the sole power and authority to determine "the kind and
quantity of goods and the prices at which such goods shall be sold to the Indians." Id. (quoting 25
U.S.C. § 261 (1958)).
279. Id. at 689. Additional regulations dictate how traders must maintain their business
records, which federal inspectors may examine "to make sure that prices charged are fair and
reasonable." Id. (citations omitted). Traders are required to pay Indians with money. Id. Further,
they are required to execute bond when applying for licenses. Id. Finally, regulations permit "the
governing body of an Indian reservation [to] assess from a trader 'such fees, etc., as it may deem
appropriate."' Id.
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The Court once again used preemption to invalidate state taxes in White
MountainApache Tribe v. Bracker, ° finding that state taxes on non-tribal
corporations conducting business solely on tribal land were preempted by
federal legislation in the area of timber management and by Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) management efforts. 2"' As with Warren TradingPost,
the Bracker holding has been limited to the facts of the case by subsequent
opinions," 2 but the Court's reasoning points to a set of relevant factors that
are similar to those discussed in Warren TradingPost. The opinion relied
on the "comprehensive" nature of federal regulation of on-reservation
timber harvesting, including legislative enactments, administrative
regulations, and the "day-to-day supervision" of the BIA.283 As in Warren
Trading Post,the breadth of government officials' power was considered
significant." The state did not have regulatory interests justifying
intervention, because the taxed activity took place solely on the reservation
using BIA roads.8 5 While acknowledging that the state had a "generalized
interest in raising revenue," the Court determined that this was not enough
to justify the tax.2" 6
280. 448 U.S. 136 (1980). A few years earlier, in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes of the FlatheadReservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), the Court struck down Montana's
"personal property tax on personal property located within the reservation[,] ... vendor license fee
sought to be applied to a reservation Indian conducting a cigarette business for the Tribe on
reservation land[,] and ... cigarette sales tax, as applied to on-reservation sales by Indians to
Indians .... on the grounds that they "conflict[ed] with the congressional statutes which provide
the basis for decision with respect to such impositions." Id.at 480-81 (citations omitted). Although
this analysis hinted at preemption, the Court actually cited the Supremacy Clause rather than
preemption as the source of the invalidation. Id. at 481 n.17.
281. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 138.
282. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 183-84 (1989).
283. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145.
284. The Court noted that the Secretary has "broad authority" over reservation timber sales
and revenue. Id. Furthermore, the Court stated:
Timber on Indian land may be sold only with the consent of the Secretary, and the
proceeds from any such sales, less administrative expenses incurred by the Federal
Government, are to be used for the benefit of the Indians or transferred to the
Indian owner. Sales of timber must "be based upon a consideration of the needs
and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs." 25 U.S.C. § 406(a). The
statute specifies the factors which the Secretary must consider in making that
determination .... He is authorized to promulgate regulations for the operation
and management of Indian forestry units." 25 U.S.C. § 466.
Id. at 146.
285. Id. at 148-50.
286. Id. at 150. See also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336 (1983)
("a state seeking to impose a tax on a transaction between a Tribe and nonmembers must point to
more than its general interest in raising revenues").
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Two years after the Bracker decision, the Court looked at similar
factors to find a state tax preempted as applied to a construction company
building an on-reservation school in Ramah Navajo School Board,Inc. v.
BoardofRevenue. 8 7 The opinion described the "[flederal regulation of the
construction and financing of Indian educational institutions. . ." as "both
comprehensive and pervasive."288 The history of the program was taken
into consideration, and the Court noted that from the first treaties between
the United States and the Navajo Nation, education ofNavajo children has
been a federal concern. 2 9 The Court also cited a number of federal statutes
pertaining to federal supervision of education of Indian children, including
the Self-Determination Act.290
While inquiries in future preemption cases will be fact-specific,
Bracker and Ramah Navajo School Boardsuggest a set of factors that are
likely to be considered with some consistency. Preemption is more likely
to be found where there is a history of federal involvement both by
Congress and by the executive branch; where the extent of authorized
executive involvement is broad; and where executive agencies have
exercised their authority extensively. Competing state interests may also
be included in the analysis. Where the regulated activity has weak offreservation effects, state interests will not weigh heavily against competing
interests of the federal and tribal governments.29 ' Specific statutory
language is likely to be a component of the analysis.292
287. 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
288. Id. at 839.
289. Id.
290. See id. at 840. The Self-Determination Act was held relevant because of its specific
reference to education. See id.
291. For example, in New Mexico v. MescaleroApache Tribe, a non-tax.case, the Court found
that the tribe and federal governments' efforts to develop wildlife resources preempted state hunting
and fishing regulations. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 344. As in Bracker and Ramah
School Board,the opinion balances state, federal, and tribal interests. Because the state regulations
conflicted with the tribal regulations, "concurrent jurisdiction would effectively nullify the tribe's
authority to control hunting and fishing on the reservation" and also would "disturb and disarrange"
the program cooperatively developed by the tribal and federal governments. Id. at 338 (citations
omitted). Congress could not have intended for the state to have jurisdiction, since management
responsibility for tribal resources had been granted to the Secretary of the Interior and to the Tribal
Council by federal law. Id. at 340. The activity had no off-reservation effect, and the Court
determined that the State provided no significant services in connection with the on-reservation
activity to be taxed. Id. at 341-42.
292. An example is Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, holding that the state of
California cannot tax offsite wagering that takes place on the reservation, because such taxes are
preempted by IGRA. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 37 F.3d 430, 435 (9th Cir.
1994). The Ninth Circuit observed that the state tax revenue exceeded the plaintiff Bands' revenue,
so the tax made the state the primary beneficiary of the gaming activities, violating the purposes
of IGRA. Id. at 433.
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A tribe that wishes to avert competing state taxes should keep these
factors in mind when drawing up its own tax and regulatory provisions.
Provisions dealing with timber, education, or other fields with a history of
either extensive federal involvement or state abdication are most likely to
preempt state taxes. When a tribe seeks to enact new taxes and avoid
overlapping state jurisdiction, it will be most likely to succeed if it
manages to pass its own provisions in conjunction with a federal statutory
program that grants broad regulatory powers, including authority to issue
detailed regulations on the matter. The tribe should push to have the statute
include explicit language that reserves the benefits of the program to the
tribe and otherwise limits state powers.
To the extent that the federal government has an interest in tribal
economic self-sufficiency, tribal taxes may implicate federal interests even
if there is no additional federal involvement. 293 It seems unlikely that the
Court would hold this interest sufficient to preempt state taxes, given its
unwillingness to accept the parallel argument that the states' general
interest in collecting revenue justifies imposition of taxes on tribal
activities where they would not otherwise be permitted.294 Taxes, therefore,
should be imposed as part of a broader regulatory program and not as
stand-alone revenue measures, and they are more likely to preempt state
taxes if they are enacted in conjunction with federal involvement in tribal
affairs.
Increased federal involvement in tribal administration may, in some
circumstances, be undesirable enough to outweigh the benefits of
additional tax revenue. Courts have suggested that tribes might be able to
preempt state taxes on their own, without federal involvement, provided
that they exercise "properly delegated federal power to do so."29 For
example, if Congress delegated environmental protection authority to a
tribe, and if the tribe exercised its authority to regulate development,
pollution, or other on-reservation environmental concerns, then state taxes
imposed as part of state environmental regulations might be preempted.2 96
Certain kinds of motor vehicle regulations, such as tribal vehicle
293. Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553, 556 (8th Cir. 1958).
294. See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 336; see supra text accompanying note
286. The Court has noted that mere federal approval of tribal taxing ordinances is not sufficient to
preempt state taxes. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134, 156 (1979).
295. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 156.
296. The Seventh Circuit has found that tribes may even have limited off-reservation
jurisdiction with regards to environmental regulation, when off-reservation activity threatens
resources on the reservation. See Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 750 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding
the EPA's designation of "Treatment of State" status on the Mole Lake Band for purposes of
administering the Clean Water Act).
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registrations, appear to have preemptive force on the reservation
independently of federal action. 9 Programs that try to shape individual
consumption preferences might preempt conflicting state regulations. 9
B. Taxing Nonmembers on Fee Land Under the Montana
Consent Exception
After Atkinson Trading Co., any taxes imposed on nonmembers for
activity on non-fee land must either be authorized by Congress or must fall
within one of the Montana exceptions. A difficult question is whether the
exceptions encompass much at all. The outlines of the consent exception
are especially difficult to determine afterAtkinson Trading Co. and Hicks.
The consensual relationship "must stem from commercial dealing,
contracts, leases," or other private, consensual arrangements299 and the tax
must "have a nexus to the consensual relationship itself.''3° Atkinson
Trading Co. left the exact meaning of these requirements very unclear.
This section of the Article will consider how tribes might enact valid
provisions under this Montana exception.
Express consent by nonmembers generally would qualify."' This
ordinarily would be difficult to obtain, but under certain circumstances,
297. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 162-164 (striking down state vehicle excise tax imposed on cars
belonging to tribal members living on the reservation).
298. Colville suggested that a tribe could, theoretically, impose a set of cigarette regulations
that would preempt conflicting state regulations. See id.at 158. The Colville respondents suggested
that the tribe's interests were served by imposing a cigarette tax that was lower than the state tax,
an argument that the Court did not find compelling. Id.
A more convincing fact scenario would
exist if the state challenged a tribal tax that was higher than the state tax. See id. Such facts would
moot the tax comparative advantage issue in Colville, and to the extent that the tax was designed
to eliminate certain activity, it would fail as a revenue-raising measure if it succeeded in its
regulatory goals. See id.
299. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 655 (2001) (internal quotations and
citation omitted); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 n.3 (2001).
300. Id. at 656.
301. However, in Merrion v.JicarillaApache Tribe, the Court suggested that tribal power to
tax may be independent of consent. The Court found that the Tribe was not estopped from taxing
abusiness merely because the Tribe and the business entered into a commercial agreement. Merrion
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 138 (1981). The Tribe had entered mineral leases with
Merrion that gave Merrion exclusive rights to mine oil and natural gas on the leased land in
exchange for "a cash bonus, royalties, and rents," and reserved to the Tribe the right to use the oil
and gas for free on the leased lands. Id. at 135. The Tribe imposed a severance tax on oil and gas
production that was independent of the contractual agreement. Id. at 135-36. The Court said that
the Tribe's commercial partnership with Merrion was distinct from its role as governing sovereign,
and "[wjhatever place consent may have in contractual matters and in the creation of democratic
governments, it has little if any role in measuring the validity of an exercise of legitimate sovereign
authority." Id. at 147. Atkinson Trading Co. qualified Merrion and established that consent is
relevant to determining the validity of tribal taxes. Atkinson TradingCo., 532 U.S. at 654.
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tribes may have the necessary leverage to convince nonmembers to agree
to be taxed. Access to on-reservation resources could be linked to consent,
and tribes entering into commercial deals with nonmembers could make
consent to taxation a contractual condition.30 2 The Court also has suggested
that fee-for-service schemes are permissible.3" 3 While "generalized
availability of tribal services" cannot sustain jurisdiction, tribes may
contract with nonmembers on fee land to provide them with emergency
services, trash collection, or3 other
services that the tribe does not provide
4
0
agreement.
formal
a
absent
Under certain circumstances, it may be difficult enough to distinguish
between activity taking place on and off reservation land that a tribe's
territorial taxation right may also justify the imposition of taxes
extraterritorially. For example, a tribe may wish to impose a severance tax
on an energy company that either mines resources from beneath nonreservation land by drilling on reservation land, or vice-versa. By either
locating drilling operations on the reservation or accessing reserves located
beneath reservation lands, energy companies enter the tribe's territory and
arguably consent to tribal jurisdiction. The Court has held that severance
taxes on oil and gas production on reservation land are a valid exercise of
tribal sovereignty.3 °5 Such taxes certainly would be frustrated if companies
could merely locate on fee simple land and mine the same oil and gas
reserves without paying taxes. Although the Merrion opinion did not
address the location of the oil and gas before it was severed from the land,
the holding supports tribal jurisdiction to tax energy resources produced
on the reservation generally, and arguably supports jurisdiction regardless
of whether they had been located below reservation or fee land.30 6
Taxes could be imposed on other natural resource operations that
involve activity on both fee and non-fee land within reservation
boundaries. For instance, taxes on timber operations that take place partly
on non-fee land might be justified on the grounds that the nonmember
harvester consented to tribal jurisdiction of the fee-land operations by
choosing to operate partly on non-fee land.30 7 The argument would be
especially strong where activity on fee land could directly affect resource

302. Cf.Merrion, 455 U.S. at 145-46 (rejecting the argument that the tribe abdicated taxation
powers over nonmembers by entering business contracts with them).
303. Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 655.
304. Id.
305. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 152.
306. See id.
307. Cf Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989).
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management on non-fee land, as might be the case for a renewable
resource such as timber or game.
Tribes might attempt to tax off-reservation businesses that directly
benefit from certain kinds of generally available tribal services. Atkinson
Trading Co. left this possibility open, although the services would need to
be very specific so that they would not result in the Montana consent
exception "swallow[ing] the rule."3 ° For example, if the tribe provides an
unusual service, such as transportation to and around a remote reservation,
use by nonmembers might constitute consent.30 9 The nonmembers' use of
the services would need to be in connection with commercial dealings,
contracts, leases, or other private consensual arrangements.310
C. Taxing Nonmembers on Fee Land Under the Montana SelfGovernance Exception
Atkinson TradingCo. narrowed the Montanaself-governance exception
and made it particularly difficult to meet the requirements with respect to
taxation. The Court rejected the idea that taxation of nonmembers on fee
land is inherently necessary to tribal self-government, and held that the
exception in general would be limited to situations where "the drain of the
nonmember's conduct upon tribal services and resources is so severe that
it actually "imperil[s]" the political integrity of the Indian tribe."'31 I Even
prior to Atkinson Trading Co., a number of cases suggested that
impediments to tribal tax policy would not be viewed as threats to selfgovernment.3 12 While Merrion has sometimes been cited for the
proposition that taxation powers are an important element of tribal self-

308. Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 655.
309. Id.
310. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 n.3 (2001).
311. Id. at 657 n.12 (internal citation omitted).
312. Cases that evaluate the validity of state. taxes determine that the state provisions do not
threaten tribal self governance. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450
(1995) (state's power to tax its residents' income trumps any tribal self-governance interest in
preempting state taxes on tribal employees who live off the reservation); County of Yakima v.
Confederated Tribe and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 265 (1992) (Indian
Reorganization Act does not eliminate state jurisdiction to levy in rem taxes on fee land within the
reservation); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
156 (1980) (internal citation omitted) ("Washington does not infringe the right of reservation
Indians to 'make their own laws and be ruled by them,' merely because the result of imposing its
taxes will be to deprive the Tribes of revenues which they currently are receiving.").
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government, 13this aspect of the decision has little weight after Atkinson

Trading Co.3
A tax program that meets the self-governance exception almost
certainly would have to be part of a broader regulatory program reflecting
non-revenue interests. Taxes on activities that are directly linked to tribal
government would be most likely to survive challenge. Tribes could
impose taxes or fees to regulate nonmember participation in tribal
government through lobbying activities. Nonmembers filing suit in tribal
court might be required to make payments for the privilege of availing
themselves of the tribal justice system. Where tribal government is linked
with religion, preservation of religious heritage may also implicate selfgovernance, and tax and regulatory programs that protect sites of spiritual
significance may fall under the second Montana exception.
Other regulatory areas could implicate self-governance and justify
tribal taxes on nonmembers. For example, tribal regulation in areas of
safety, health and the environment will be stymied ifjurisdiction does not
extend onto fee-simple land, since businesses could avoid compliance
costs by strategically locating just outside of tribal jurisdiction. Such
programs may be able to overcome Brendale if the tribe can show that the
off-reservation
activity would have a "demonstrably serious" impact on
3 14
the tribe.

These examples demonstrate the continuing relevance of the second
Montana exception after Atkinson Trading Co. Nonetheless, the high
standard applied in Atkinson TradingCo. and the Court's general hostility
to self-governance mean that the validity of any such tax would be
questionable. Self-governance should be relied on only with great caution,
and the case for self-governance taxes will be much stronger if the
nonmember being taxed has also consented to tribal jurisdiction.
The examples also illustrate how the self-governance doctrine imposes
costs on a tribe's decision to tax nonmembers by requiring that such
provisions be enacted in conjunction with extensive regulatory programs.
Expenditures in furtherance of the new programs could outweigh increased
revenue. The joint impact of the taxes and the regulations on businesses
would be greater than the impact of the taxes alone, increasing the
possibility that businesses would decide against making investments that
could boost reservation economic activity. Tribes also have an interest in
being able to choose the manner in which they impose their taxes and
313. See Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 654. The relevance of Merrion is limited in any
case because it dealt with a tribal tax imposed on nonmembers engaging in on-reservation activities,
rather than activity on fee land. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 133.
314. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 431.
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regulations, and the current law limits tribal sovereignty by imposing

constraints on tribal tax decisions. When faced with the costs that the selfgovernance doctrine places on exercising tax jurisdiction, tribes may
decide to pass on the additional revenue.
D. ExtrajudicialResponses to Tribal Taxation Decisions
While tribes might attempt to enact taxes within the existing federal
legal framework, the restrictions on tax authority are so severe and poorlydefined that it is often impossible to know whether a provision will survive
legal challenge. Tribal governments might be better served by trying to
change the rules. Agreements between tribes and states can facilitate the
exercise of fiscal policy while avoiding costly litigation that, in the current
judicial climate, would be likely to result in further restrictions on tribal
tax authority. In the long run, however, legislation is necessary to restore
full tax powers to tribes.
Many tribes have entered into agreements with states about balancing
tribal and state taxing power.3" 5 By one count, as many as two hundred
such agreements currently exist, with most addressing taxation of nonmembers on tribal land.3"' These agreements generally require the tribe to
collect taxes that approximate or equal to the taxes that would be collected
by non-tribal retailers, with the tribes either keeping the revenues or
sharing them with the state.3 7 The tribes benefit because their tax revenue
is higher than it would be if the state collected full state taxes from onreservation sales and because they retain some autonomy over onreservation tax collection. Off-reservation retailers benefit too because
theyneed not compete with tribal retailers who otherwise might not collect
state taxes on their on-reservation sales.3"' States benefit from revenue-

315. A list of some of these agreements can be found on the web site of the National Congress
of American Indians. See National Congress of American Indians, Tax Agreements, at
http://www.ncai.org/main/pages/issues/govemance/agreements/taxagreements.asp (last visited
May 12, 2004).
316. Lorie Graham, Graham: Securing Economic Sovereignty Through Agreement, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, Sept. 5, 2003, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/?1062782561 (last
visited July 29, 2004).
317. Id.
318. Under Colville, states may collect state taxes from on reservation sales, but some state

courts have held that their state executives may not collect taxes from on-reservation sales to
nonmembers. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Idaho, 524 P.2d 187 (Idaho 1974); see generally Kevin Taylor,
4 Tribes to Put Tax Stamps on Cigarettes, SPOKANE SPOKESMAN-REv., Dec. 6, 2003, available at
http://www.spokesmanreview.com/pf.asp?date=i20603&ID=sl451623& (last visited July 23,
2004).
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sharing agreements because they save the cost of enforcing state tax
provisions on reservation land.3 19
It is important to realize, however, that tribal benefits from such
agreements are limited. Tribes may be motivated to contract with states to
hold off state enforcement action and litigation.32 With the legal rules
skewed against them, tribal governments hold weak bargaining positions
vis ? vis the states, and are unlikely to benefit from taxation agreements as
much as they would benefit from fully autonomous fiscal powers.
Congressional action could also expand the reach of tribal

jurisdiction.32' Individual enactments addressing specific tribal issues may
affect the judicial outcomes on issues such as legal incidence, preemption,
consent and self-governance. More sweeping jurisdictional statutes,

however, might expand the situations in which tribes may impose taxes
free from competing state provisions. 22
Legislation has the added appeal of addressing the proposition that
policy issues related to taxation are best addressed through Congress.
Critics of broad tribal authority argue that because nonmembers have no

say in tribes' tax policies, imposing taxes on nonmembers is
undemocratic.323 A clear congressional grant of tax jurisdiction would
alleviate these accountability concerns.
Courts look frequently to congressional guidance when deciding Indian
tax law cases, which are generally statutory in nature. 324 Tribal powers are

derived from "retained or inherent sovereignty," which the Court has
described as limited by treaties and other congressional enactments.325
What Congress taketh away, it may also give, and Congress may either
authorize tribal taxes or prohibit state taxes that interfere with tribal
jurisdiction.326
319. See id.
320. Id.
321. See United States v. Lara, 124 S.Ct. 1628 (2004) (Congress may restore inherent tribal
legal authority previously restricted by the political branches).
322. See Randi Hicks Rowe, Tribe's Ability to Tax Non-Indian Businesses Is Major Issue,
NATIVE AM. L. DIG., Aug. 2002, at 1.
323. See id.
324. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995) (invalidating
state excise tax on fuel sold by Chickasaw Nation retailers on trust land because the incidence of
the tax falls on the retailers); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992) (General Allotment Act permits state to impose ad valorem tax
on land, but not excise tax on land sales); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163
(1989) (Congress may prohibit state taxation of nonmember leases from the tribe).
325. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 649-50 (2001).
326. See Lara,124 S. Ct. at 1628; Atkinson TradingCo., 532 U.S. at 654 ("Because Congress
has not authorized the Navajo Nation's hotel occupancy tax through treaty or statute, and because
the incidence of the tax falls upon nonmembers on non-Indian fee land, it is incumbent upon the
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The National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) has developed a
legislative proposal to clarify and broaden tribal jurisdiction in the wake
of Atkinson Trading Co. and Hicks.327 The model legislation includes an
affirmation of tribes' inherent authority to exercise "[w]ithin their
territorial jurisdiction, all sovereign governmental authority and powers,"
including the power to tax.323 The statute would specify that "[a]n Indian
tribe's authority and powers shall extend to all places and persons within
its Indian country. .. ,,,329 an area that includes land held in fee simple and
that therefore is broader than the current territorial extent of tribal tax
authority. 330 Perhaps most significantly, jurisdiction over nonmembers
would be extended "to any person, activity, or event having sufficient
minimum contacts with a tribe's territorial jurisdiction to meet the
requirements of due process. 33' This would replace the Montana
framework with a laxer, InternationalShoe 332 - type test that could allow
tribes to tax nonmember businesses on the basis of their contacts with
members or with reservation lands. The expandedjurisdiction would likely
include nonmember businesses located on fee-simple land within the
reservation.
The model statute contains several provisions that would help to
minimize state encroachment on tribal tax jurisdiction. It codifies the
categorical prohibition against state taxation of Indians within Indian
Country 333 by explicitly prohibiting state exercise of "civil or criminal
authority, powers, or jurisdiction within Indian Country or with respect to
any valid off-reservation rights unless such state authority is expressly and
clearly granted by an Indian treaty, an Act of Congress, or a voluntary
agreement between an Indian tribe and a State., 334 This provision applies
to both members and nonmembers, so it would broadly invalidate many
Navajo Nation to establish the existence ofone ofMontana'sexceptions."); Yakima Indian Nation,
502 U.S. at 267 (absent congressional grant, there is a "categorical prohibition" against state
taxation of tribal members on the reservation).
327. See National Congress of American Indians, Tribal Sovereignty and Economic
Enhancement Act of 2002, Nov. 15, 2002 [hereinafter Draft Legislation], available at
www.ncai.org (last visited July 23, 2004).
328. Id. §§ 5(b)(1)& (3).
329. Id. § 5(c)(1).
330. See Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 653 ("An Indian tribe's sovereign power to tax...
reaches no further than tribal land" and therefore does not include jurisdiction to tax activity on fee
simple land). The statute also would amend the current definition of Indian Country to further
expand jurisdiction. See Draft Legislation, supra note 327, § 5(c)(2).
331. Draft Legislation, supra note 327, § 5(c)(1).
332. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
333. See supra text accompanying note 326.
334. Draft Legislation, supra note 327, § 6(a).
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state taxes.335 However, the statute would not alter state obligations to
provide services within Indian Country, and tribes and states would share
jurisdiction over such programs.336 As an additional sweetener for the
states, the Payments in Lieu of Taxes statute33 7 would be amended so that
states would receive federal payments in lieu of taxes for land within
Indian Country.33
Discussions about the bill's language are ongoing, and the NCAI has
found Senate sponsors to introduce the legislation once the NCAI's
drafting process is completed.339 One drawback to a legislative solution,
however, is the potential difficulty of passing a statute to broaden tribal
powers. As tribes increasingly gain significant political power, a grassroots
movement is emerging with the goal of stemming tribal authority.34 ° The
prospects for passage are difficult to gauge at this point, but nonmember
businesses that conduct on-reservation activity or operate in competition
with tribal businesses are likely to fight the enactment.

V. CONCLUSION

The case law on tribal taxation has significantly curtailed a vital power
inherent to sovereign authority. This is particularly troublesome because
it comes at a time when some tribal governments, especially those
involved in gaming, are otherwise growing in power and developing
greater potential to help all tribal governments assert their sovereign
powers and improve on-reservation economic opportunities.34 ' As some
tribes have gained influence through their business ventures, and as actions
taken by Congress and by the executive branch have encouraged selfdetermination, the judiciary has made it more difficult for tribes to earn
revenue through the simple sovereign exercise of taxation. Tribes' power
to impose taxes on nonmembers have been narrowly defined, thus limiting
the benefits tribes can reap from increasing levels of investment on
reservation lands. In addition, the Court has strictly construed the
definition of tribal territory to limit the geographic boundaries of tribal tax
jurisdiction. Moreover, state tax jurisdiction is being strengthened, making
335. See supra text accompanying notes 267-94.
336. Draft Legislation, supra note 327, § 6(a).
337. 31 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6907 (2004).

338. Id. § 9(b).
339. Press Release, Tribal Sovereignty Protection Initiative (May 19-20, 2003), availableat
www.ncai.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2004).
340. Leslie Linthicum, Indian Congress Gathers in Duke City, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 16,
2003, at Al.
341. See Graham, supra note 316.
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it easier for the states to drive out tribal tax programs. The course of
development in the case law further weakens substantive tribal powers by
leaving the extent of such powers uncertain and open to future litigation
by nonmembers and by states.
The tightening in the federal case law may be reactive. Tribal
governments posed no threat to the federal system while they remained
economically poor. Now that some tribes have become powerful and
wealthy, however, their potential impact has grown, not just with regard
to effects on individual nonmembers, but also more generally in terms of
the national balance of powers. Thus the Court's recent approach to federal
Indian law can be viewed as limiting any disruption in the balance between
federal and state power that might be caused by more powerful tribal
governments.
Tribes that choose to invite nonmembers into their communities should
be free to regulate the resulting relationships, including - if they wish through the power to tax. They should have the same authority as other
sovereigns to tax those who benefit by entering their jurisdiction. Given
the current state of the case law, however, Tribes should work within the
existing framework to shape tax provisions that can survive judicial
review. This Article has suggested a number of areas over which valid
taxes might be imposed, focusing on preemption, consent, and selfgovernance. Tribes should also work to prevent the states from imposing
taxes that effectively oust tribal jurisdiction.
Ultimately, however, a legislative solution is needed to restore full
tribal tax power. The NCAI proposal addresses several important issues by
expanding tribal jurisdiction, limiting state jurisdiction, and providing
federal payments to states to compensate for lost revenue. Passage of this
statute or another legislative solution may be the most effective way for
tribes to reclaim full tribal taxation powers and use fiscal policy to build
economically strong communities.

